FKIE_CVE-2026-99528
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:18 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0a908446c5edc42905f9136e91bbf4e45d0747b6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3c3b401650227e147c609c33fa458d5d963f2918",
"status": "affected",
"version": "030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "75120454474be7bc62b77af12bd591a339be27e1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e7a8721b7edb54a157623f9e31d71345333b5fb9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.10"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.10",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.117",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.61",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSUNRPC: fix netns use-after-free in write_gssp()\n\nWhile fuzzing with a customized syzkaller, I hit a refcount warning in\nxprt_alloc(), reached from a write to /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy:\n\n refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\n WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0xf8/0x120\n CPU: 0 PID: 10404 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc1-00096-gcfebfd3db73d\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n xprt_alloc+0x83f/0x9d0\n xs_setup_xprt+0xaf/0x3c0\n xs_setup_local+0x47/0x7f0\n xprt_create_transport+0x16c/0x730\n rpc_create+0x38e/0x7f0\n gssp_rpc_create+0xe2/0x180\n set_gssp_clnt+0xba/0x1b0\n write_gssp+0x200/0x310\n proc_reg_write+0x240/0x330\n vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1050\n ksys_write+0x12a/0x250\n do_syscall_64+0x117/0x750\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\ncreate_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() stores the struct net pointer as the\nproc entry\u0027s private data without taking a reference on it, and an open\nfile descriptor does not pin the namespace either, as procfs only pins\nthe proc_dir_entry. write_gssp() reads that pointer back with\npde_data() and hands it to set_gssp_clnt(), which reaches xprt_init():\n\n\txprt-\u003exprt_net = get_net_track(net, \u0026xprt-\u003ens_tracker, GFP_KERNEL);\n\nget_net_track() -\u003e get_net() -\u003e refcount_inc() is unconditional, so\nrpc_create() assumes its caller holds a reference on args.net.\nwrite_gssp() does not.\n\nDropping the last ns.count reference does not make the file go away.\n__put_net() only queues cleanup_net() on a workqueue, and the\nremove_proc_entry() that fences off further writes runs from the\nrpcsec_gss pernet .exit method, that is, from inside cleanup_net(). A\nwrite landing between those two points increments a refcount that is\nalready zero. cleanup_net() does not re-read ns.count, so the namespace\nis freed anyway and the rpc_xprt -- along with the AF_LOCAL socket\nopened for it -- is left pointing at freed memory. The resurrected\ncount is visible to the rest of that teardown too: with\nCONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE the same cleanup_net() worker then trips\n!mr_can_free_table() in ip6mr_free_table(), which tests check_net() on\nthe namespace it is freeing.\n\nIt reduces to opening /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy inside a new network\nnamespace, calling setns() back to the original one to drop the last\nreference, and then writing \"1\" to the still-open descriptor.\n\nTake the reference in write_gssp() itself and refuse the write when the\nnamespace is already gone. This is what procfs does for every other\n/proc/net file: get_proc_net() is maybe_get_net(PDE_NET(PDE(inode)))\nand seq_open_net() returns -ENXIO when it fails. PDE_NET() cannot be\nreused here because the parent directory /proc/net/rpc carries no\nnamespace pointer. Adding a .pre_exit to rpcsec_gss_net_ops so the\nentry is removed earlier would only narrow the window, since pre_exit\nalso runs from cleanup_net().\n\nLive namespaces are unaffected: a write still returns the error from\nset_gssp_clnt(), a write of \"2\" still returns -EINVAL, and reads are\nuntouched."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99528",
"lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:18:08.517",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-19T15:18:08.517",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a908446c5edc42905f9136e91bbf4e45d0747b6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c3b401650227e147c609c33fa458d5d963f2918"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75120454474be7bc62b77af12bd591a339be27e1"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7a8721b7edb54a157623f9e31d71345333b5fb9"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.