FKIE_CVE-2026-99525
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:18 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/client/sess.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "d88e3e844fad0f6b9fbeb8c8862f9272a7c26a99",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ee1d21794e55ab76505745d24101331552182002",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8069935474b1502459ab50f75a67d7394a93cd5d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ee1d21794e55ab76505745d24101331552182002",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "72367dacb5c9d8bd486b2fcaf56b6d3086d57250",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ee1d21794e55ab76505745d24101331552182002",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "031278577380e7875d95aed81a2b2bcac39be923",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ee1d21794e55ab76505745d24101331552182002",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "e341b7975bd72d3ebda92b8d747d0aad15ce8717",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3e1615361b6fa6e6e0bfae0efb3a8c2255ac101f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.1.178",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6.15",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/client/sess.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.7"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.117",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.61",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix use-after-free in cifs_ses_add_channel()\n\nThe error path of cifs_ses_add_channel() calls cifs_put_tcp_session()\nbefore cifs_chan_clear_need_reconnect(). The latter reaches\ncifs_ses_get_chan_index(), which dereferences server-\u003eterminate; if\nthe put was the final reference, TCP_Server_Info is already freed and\nthis is a use-after-free. Same put-then-use pattern as the recently\nfixed sibling in commit 717e0a25036b (\"cifs: Fix server use-after-free\nin cifs_chan_skip_or_disable()\").\n\nMove the put last, but do not read chan-\u003eserver after dropping\nchan_lock: chan points into ses-\u003echans[], and once chan_count is\ndecremented a concurrent add_channel can reuse the slot and overwrite\nthe pointer, so the put would act on the new channel\u0027s server. Cache\nthe pointer under chan_lock, clear the reconnect bit and decrement\nchan_count while still holding the reference, and release it after\nthe unlock.\n\nThis issue was discovered by Tencent CodeBuddy Security."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99525",
"lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:18:08.147",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-19T15:18:08.147",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/031278577380e7875d95aed81a2b2bcac39be923"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72367dacb5c9d8bd486b2fcaf56b6d3086d57250"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8069935474b1502459ab50f75a67d7394a93cd5d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d88e3e844fad0f6b9fbeb8c8862f9272a7c26a99"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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