FKIE_CVE-2026-99488

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:18 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: klist: avoid accesses after waking klist_remove() klist_remove() waits until a node is unreferenced so that its caller can free the containing object. klist_release() currently publishes waiter->woken and wakes the waiter before its final accesses to the waiter and node. klist_remove() can then return, allowing its stack waiter and the containing object to be freed or reused while klist_release() is still running. In particular, bus_remove_driver() can free drv->p while __device_attach() walks the same bus klist with bus_for_each_drv(). On an arm64 Cortex-A72 system, an unpatched 7.2.0-rc3 kernel with CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y reproduced the bug through the in-tree I2C/at24 path. KASAN reported a use-after-free in klist_dec_and_del() reached from klist_next()/bus_for_each_drv() while at24 was being unregistered. Clear n_klist and take a task reference before publishing woken. Use release/acquire accesses for that publication and wake the referenced task. The task reference keeps the waiter task alive if it returns and exits before wake_up_process().
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/klist.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "3fee2a5ef405f08ea3d87d2014ae7d38e61dd06f",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "8b0c250be489dcbf1a3a33bb4ec4c7f33735a365",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "d655ef174056457d1c3bc06b4405097e0a9b3bf5",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "8b0c250be489dcbf1a3a33bb4ec4c7f33735a365",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7d3df012573523cb2f38a65e3e00125d9869b390",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "8b0c250be489dcbf1a3a33bb4ec4c7f33735a365",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "732e3e10234cbe302d0dcbaa98c91c66628209cb",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "8b0c250be489dcbf1a3a33bb4ec4c7f33735a365",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/klist.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.6.13"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.6.13",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.117",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.61",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nklist: avoid accesses after waking klist_remove()\n\nklist_remove() waits until a node is unreferenced so that its caller can\nfree the containing object.  klist_release() currently publishes\nwaiter-\u003ewoken and wakes the waiter before its final accesses to the waiter\nand node.  klist_remove() can then return, allowing its stack waiter and\nthe containing object to be freed or reused while klist_release() is still\nrunning.  In particular, bus_remove_driver() can free drv-\u003ep while\n__device_attach() walks the same bus klist with bus_for_each_drv().\n\nOn an arm64 Cortex-A72 system, an unpatched 7.2.0-rc3 kernel with\nCONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y reproduced the bug through the\nin-tree I2C/at24 path.  KASAN reported a use-after-free in\nklist_dec_and_del() reached from klist_next()/bus_for_each_drv() while\nat24 was being unregistered.\n\nClear n_klist and take a task reference before publishing woken.  Use\nrelease/acquire accesses for that publication and wake the referenced\ntask.  The task reference keeps the waiter task alive if it returns and\nexits before wake_up_process()."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99488",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:18:03.620",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:18:03.620",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3fee2a5ef405f08ea3d87d2014ae7d38e61dd06f"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/732e3e10234cbe302d0dcbaa98c91c66628209cb"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d3df012573523cb2f38a65e3e00125d9869b390"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d655ef174056457d1c3bc06b4405097e0a9b3bf5"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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