FKIE_CVE-2026-99485

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:18 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails aie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a failed start frees it again: hwctx->priv->mbox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev->mbox); ... ret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann, ...); if (ret) goto free_channel; ... free_channel: xdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann); hwctx->priv->mbox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That pointer is the driver's own test for whether a hardware context has a usable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL, aie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message helpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them. It matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls aie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live, after aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context survives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return value entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is left is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every later user of it takes the non-NULL branch: - the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(), - a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() -> aie2_destroy_context(), - closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() -> aie2_release_resource() -> xrs_release_resource() -> aie2_xrs_unload() -> aie2_destroy_context(), and aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel() followed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already freed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel. The AIE4 management channel already does this correctly - aie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev->aie.mgmt_chann right after freeing it. Do the same here. The create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails, xrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling ->unload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx->priv, so the stale pointer never outlives the structure holding it. Starting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer sizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and request_irq() can fail.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/accel/amdxdna/aie2_message.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "35003a3a2221207ded92ca4c60a54c2f83136473",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d5b8b0347fa8470b751a506fb801797e271d7548",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2117e3d96a4fd1ee13fa28b31494ff5f5db6ccf4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d5b8b0347fa8470b751a506fb801797e271d7548",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/accel/amdxdna/aie2_message.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.0"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.0",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naccel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails\n\naie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a\nfailed start frees it again:\n\n\thwctx-\u003epriv-\u003embox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev-\u003embox);\n\t...\n\tret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx-\u003epriv-\u003embox_chann, ...);\n\tif (ret)\n\t\tgoto free_channel;\n\t...\nfree_channel:\n\txdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx-\u003epriv-\u003embox_chann);\n\nhwctx-\u003epriv-\u003embox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That\npointer is the driver\u0027s own test for whether a hardware context has a\nusable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL,\naie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message\nhelpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them.\n\nIt matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls\naie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live,\nafter aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context\nsurvives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return\nvalue entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is\nleft is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every\nlater user of it takes the non-NULL branch:\n\n  - the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed\n    channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(),\n  - a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() -\u003e\n    aie2_destroy_context(),\n  - closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() -\u003e\n    aie2_release_resource() -\u003e xrs_release_resource() -\u003e\n    aie2_xrs_unload() -\u003e aie2_destroy_context(),\n\nand aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel()\nfollowed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already\nfreed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel.\n\nThe AIE4 management channel already does this correctly -\naie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev-\u003eaie.mgmt_chann right after freeing\nit. Do the same here.\n\nThe create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails,\nxrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling\n-\u003eunload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx-\u003epriv, so the stale pointer\nnever outlives the structure holding it.\n\nStarting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer\nsizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and\nrequest_irq() can fail."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99485",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:18:03.267",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:18:03.267",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2117e3d96a4fd1ee13fa28b31494ff5f5db6ccf4"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35003a3a2221207ded92ca4c60a54c2f83136473"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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