FKIE_CVE-2026-99447

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:17 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: spi-pci1xxxx: quiesce DMA engines on transfer timeout If a DMA-mapped transfer times out waiting for DMA_TERM and neither DMA abort interrupt arrived, pci1xxxx_spi_transfer_with_dma() returns through the error label while both DMA engines are still enabled, the done/abort interrupt status is still armed and the transfer state (p->xfer, p->tx_sgl, p->rx_sgl) is still registered. The ISRs keep firing afterwards: they reprogram the DMA engines from p->tx_sgl / p->rx_sgl and signal completion through p->xfer and p->spi_xfer_done, all of which the SPI core is free to unmap or reuse once transfer_one() has returned, which is a use-after-free. A late done interrupt can also start the next transfer queued behind the failed one. Stop both DMA engines, drain the pending done/abort interrupt status and synchronize the DMA IRQs before dropping the in-progress state and the transfer pointers, and re-enable the engines afterwards so that subsequent transfers keep working. The engines are only turned back on once both were confirmed to have stopped: re-enabling an engine that failed to stop would cancel the pending stop request and let it keep running into buffers the SPI core is about to unmap or free, which is exactly the window this patch closes. An engine that failed to stop is left disabled, as the abort paths already do. The DMA interrupt status and mask registers are shared between the two SPI instances, so the cleanup drains only this instance's done/abort status bits instead of masking the interrupt lines, which would also suppress the peer instance's completion interrupts. Also make the DMA ISRs ignore interrupts while no transfer is in progress so that a stray MSI after the cleanup can no longer act on the cleared state. No PCI1XXXX hardware was available for testing and QEMU has no model of this PCIe part, so the timeout path was exercised with a userspace replica of the timeout branch and the DMA ISRs, with the register and interrupt accesses mocked: on the unfixed code both a wedged engine that clears after the timeout and a late done interrupt touch the freed transfer state, while with this fix applied neither does and an engine that failed to stop is left disabled. The module was also loaded and unloaded in a QEMU x86_64 guest running a kernel with this fix applied.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/spi/spi-pci1xxxx.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "733552f8c5f5fdce6b2a135dfa2a05ead9f66e91",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9538edeb72c989a4b90964ae4bba107eaf21a791",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "d858330e288a7818cf6d52ed1bd62153f4cd35c0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9538edeb72c989a4b90964ae4bba107eaf21a791",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "0b591332a2bdc13d3f9163793131fe3651d1556a",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9538edeb72c989a4b90964ae4bba107eaf21a791",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/spi/spi-pci1xxxx.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.9"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.9",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.61",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nspi: spi-pci1xxxx: quiesce DMA engines on transfer timeout\n\nIf a DMA-mapped transfer times out waiting for DMA_TERM and neither DMA\nabort interrupt arrived, pci1xxxx_spi_transfer_with_dma() returns\nthrough the error label while both DMA engines are still enabled, the\ndone/abort interrupt status is still armed and the transfer state\n(p-\u003exfer, p-\u003etx_sgl, p-\u003erx_sgl) is still registered.\n\nThe ISRs keep firing afterwards: they reprogram the DMA engines from\np-\u003etx_sgl / p-\u003erx_sgl and signal completion through p-\u003exfer and\np-\u003espi_xfer_done, all of which the SPI core is free to unmap or reuse\nonce transfer_one() has returned, which is a use-after-free. A late\ndone interrupt can also start the next transfer queued behind the\nfailed one.\n\nStop both DMA engines, drain the pending done/abort interrupt status\nand synchronize the DMA IRQs before dropping the in-progress state and\nthe transfer pointers, and re-enable the engines afterwards so that\nsubsequent transfers keep working. The engines are only turned back on\nonce both were confirmed to have stopped: re-enabling an engine that\nfailed to stop would cancel the pending stop request and let it keep\nrunning into buffers the SPI core is about to unmap or free, which is\nexactly the window this patch closes. An engine that failed to stop is\nleft disabled, as the abort paths already do.\n\nThe DMA interrupt status and mask registers are shared between the two\nSPI instances, so the cleanup drains only this instance\u0027s done/abort\nstatus bits instead of masking the interrupt lines, which would also\nsuppress the peer instance\u0027s completion interrupts.\n\nAlso make the DMA ISRs ignore interrupts while no transfer is in\nprogress so that a stray MSI after the cleanup can no longer act on\nthe cleared state.\n\nNo PCI1XXXX hardware was available for testing and QEMU has no model\nof this PCIe part, so the timeout path was exercised with a userspace\nreplica of the timeout branch and the DMA ISRs, with the register and\ninterrupt accesses mocked: on the unfixed code both a wedged engine\nthat clears after the timeout and a late done interrupt touch the\nfreed transfer state, while with this fix applied neither does and an\nengine that failed to stop is left disabled.  The module was also\nloaded and unloaded in a QEMU x86_64 guest running a kernel with this\nfix applied."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99447",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:17:58.400",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:17:58.400",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b591332a2bdc13d3f9163793131fe3651d1556a"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/733552f8c5f5fdce6b2a135dfa2a05ead9f66e91"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d858330e288a7818cf6d52ed1bd62153f4cd35c0"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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