FKIE_CVE-2026-99443
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:17 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/pps/generators/pps_gen.c",
"include/linux/pps_gen_kernel.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a7ba1a5a0c16d3aad161681b01933703419fd52d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "86b525bed2758878e788c9fb6b8fb281fd61bdb0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ea2aaf6bda6ba90e92abe3aeaff426bba082c0eb",
"status": "affected",
"version": "86b525bed2758878e788c9fb6b8fb281fd61bdb0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4e8063cae337cb7328e6856235cf4de5d165516e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "86b525bed2758878e788c9fb6b8fb281fd61bdb0",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/pps/generators/pps_gen.c",
"include/linux/pps_gen_kernel.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.14"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.14",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.63",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npps: generators: don\u0027t use the driver\u0027s info after unregister\n\nA file that was opened before pps_gen_unregister_source() keeps\npps_gen, and with it the pointer to the driver\u0027s pps_gen_source_info.\nPPS_GEN_SETENABLE and PPS_GEN_USESYSTEMCLOCK keep using that pointer\nafter the driver has gone:\n\n - pps_gen_tio allocates its info with devm_kzalloc(), so after an\n unbind both ioctls read freed memory, and SETENABLE calls the\n driver\u0027s enable() with its freed private data.\n\n - pps_gen-dummy does not set info-\u003eowner, so it can be unloaded while\n the file is open, and the ioctls then read the unloaded module\u0027s\n data and call its code.\n\nTIO can\u0027t probe in a VM, as it needs ART. A test driver that registers\nits info in devm memory like TIO does, unbound while /dev/pps-gen0 is\nopen, gives:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pps_gen_cdev_ioctl+0x4c1/0x580\n Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800e647f38 by task ppsgen64/145\n ...\n Freed by task 146:\n kfree+0x25a/0x6d0\n release_nodes+0xd1/0x140\n devres_release_all+0x10e/0x1a0\n device_unbind_cleanup+0x71/0x250\n device_release_driver_internal+0x41b/0x570\n unbind_store+0xd9/0x100\n\nand unloading pps_gen-dummy while its file is open oopses:\n\n BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffa0203040\n Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI\n RIP: 0010:pps_gen_cdev_ioctl+0x372/0x580\n\nProtect info in the ioctl handler with a mutex, and clear it under the\nmutex on unregister, so that unregister waits for the ioctls using it\nand later ones fail with -ENODEV. PPS_KC_BIND does the same for a\nremoved PPS device since commit 3649f9a6b897 (\"pps: don\u0027t allow\nPPS_KC_BIND on removed devices\"). The sysfs attributes need nothing\nnew: they are removed, and their callbacks drained, before info is\ncleared."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99443",
"lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:17:57.923",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-19T15:17:57.923",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e8063cae337cb7328e6856235cf4de5d165516e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7ba1a5a0c16d3aad161681b01933703419fd52d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea2aaf6bda6ba90e92abe3aeaff426bba082c0eb"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.