FKIE_CVE-2026-99433
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:17 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmlock.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "11643cb726c6077c8d80766516c20ff25ba29609",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c5c54aca9d0263f81bd4886232835ba31f7635a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f4ae0b96a4abc7d59088eb2e0a2ee524c15f3bf0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c5c54aca9d0263f81bd4886232835ba31f7635a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0eb7cd1641695c5de549516661c9b90ba20f943d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c5c54aca9d0263f81bd4886232835ba31f7635a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "71743471204e21113295c786e5cfa570294234a4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c5c54aca9d0263f81bd4886232835ba31f7635a",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmlock.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.25"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.25",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.117",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.61",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2/dlm: hold a lock reference across grant AST enqueue\n\nA newly granted remote lock must remain alive until its grant AST is\nqueued. dlmlock_master() publishes the lock on res-\u003egranted with its base\nand queue references, then drops res-\u003espinlock before calling\ndlm_queue_ast(). The resource\u0027s reserved AST count does not retain the\nlock itself.\n\nThis can fail when a peer dies with an immediately grantable CREATE\nbuffered on its socket. O2NET\u0027s node-down callback flushes receive work\nbefore DLM cleanup, but the flush only waits for work queued on entry. A\ndata-ready callback that already selected the socket container can queue\nnew receive work after the flush advances its work color. Socket shutdown\ndoes not discard bytes already queued for TCP receive.\n\nThe late receive work and DLM node-down cleanup can interleave as\nfollows (the lock reference operations shown are before this fix):\n\n Socket data-ready Node-down thread Receive worker\n ----------------- ---------------- --------------\n o2net_data_ready()\n select sc under\n callback read lock\n o2net_disconnect_node()\n queue shutdown\n begin flush; new color\n queue sc_rx_work\n in the new color\n release callback lock\n shutdown socket\n flush returns\n read buffered CREATE\n dlmlock_master()\n lock res-\u003espinlock\n add lock to granted\n unlock res-\u003espinlock\n DLM node-down cleanup\n lock res-\u003espinlock\n dlm_free_dead_locks()\n unlink lock\n put queue/base refs\n free lock\n unlock res-\u003espinlock\n dlm_queue_ast()\n __dlm_queue_ast()\n read lock-\u003elockres\n (use-after-free)\n\nDLM cleanup holds res-\u003espinlock while dlm_free_dead_locks() drops the\nqueue and base references. The CREATE handler no longer holds that\nspinlock when __dlm_queue_ast() reads the lock, before taking its AST list\nreference.\n\nTake a temporary lock reference under res-\u003espinlock when a grant AST will\nbe queued, and drop it after dlm_queue_ast(). This keeps the lock alive\nacross cleanup until the AST path has taken its own reference, without\nreversing the existing AST/resource lock order.\n\nKASAN report as below:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __dlm_queue_ast+0x8a4/0xc00\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810ead5940 by task kworker/u16:3/52\n\n CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 52 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-bt-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)\n Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014\n Workqueue: o2net o2net_rx_until_empty\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0\n print_report+0xce/0x630\n ? __dlm_queue_ast+0x8a4/0xc00\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420\n ? __dlm_queue_ast+0x8a4/0xc00\n kasan_report+0xe0/0x110\n ? __dlm_queue_ast+0x8a4/0xc00\n __dlm_queue_ast+0x8a4/0xc00\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x130/0x270\n ? __pfx___dlm_queue_ast+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10\n ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x45/0x60\n ? srs\n---truncated---"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99433",
"lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:17:56.680",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-19T15:17:56.680",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0eb7cd1641695c5de549516661c9b90ba20f943d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11643cb726c6077c8d80766516c20ff25ba29609"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71743471204e21113295c786e5cfa570294234a4"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f4ae0b96a4abc7d59088eb2e0a2ee524c15f3bf0"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.