FKIE_CVE-2026-99421

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:17 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovl: always encode the origin fh when index is enabled On an overlay with index=on,nfs_export=on, copy up of a directory crashes the kernel once an LSM has started to deny CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH to the mounter, the task that mounted the overlay. The mount and the LSM policy change require root. After that, any user who can write to a directory that exists only in a lower layer triggers the oops by doing so. Before a file or directory that exists only in a lower layer is changed for the first time, overlayfs copies it to the writable upper layer. This is called copy up. On copy up, ovl_get_origin_fh() encodes the file handle of the lower inode, called the origin. It returns NULL if ovl_can_decode_fh() says that the lower filesystem cannot decode handles. Whether the callers can handle NULL depends on the index option: - Without an index, NULL is fine: the callers store an empty origin xattr. - With index enabled, overlayfs keeps entries for copied up inodes in an internal index directory. The name of an index entry is derived from the handle, so ovl_get_origin_fh() must return a handle or an error. The mount only enables the index if ovl_can_decode_fh() succeeds for all layers, but the result can change later. The function checks the export operations of the filesystem and capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH). Copy up runs with the mounter's credentials, and an LSM can start to deny the capability to those credentials after the mount. ovl_get_origin_fh() then returns NULL with index enabled. This goes wrong in two callers: - With nfs_export=on, copy up of a directory creates an index entry for the directory. ovl_create_index() passes the NULL handle to ovl_get_index_name_fh(), which dereferences it. - If the result changes while mount(2) is still running, ovl_get_indexdir() passes a NULL from ovl_get_origin_fh() to ovl_verify_set_fh() in the same way. Before the commit in the Fixes tag, these two callers encoded the handle themselves, without consulting ovl_can_decode_fh(). Reproduced with a BPF LSM program that started to deny the capability after the mount. An unprivileged touch in a directory that had not been copied up yet oopsed in ovl_get_index_name_fh(). With this patch the touch succeeds and the directory gets its index entry. Fix this by calling ovl_can_decode_fh() in ovl_get_origin_fh() only when index is disabled.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1795ca6571199008f67afa9e88cddf199ddde9ca",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "26423e18cd6f709ca4fe7194c29c11658cd0cdd0",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4a58c0d62bd23173dee3f337f623d3e14b6c9dd4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5b02bfc1e7e3811c5bf7f0fa626a0694d0dbbd77",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b050952bc4e3409c655a4abcd987131bd77ef570",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5b02bfc1e7e3811c5bf7f0fa626a0694d0dbbd77",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5ccb1e71dfea95a9789967c34d68a2b7c048303e",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5b02bfc1e7e3811c5bf7f0fa626a0694d0dbbd77",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "949f9d8a5580c77a45fa759123367682aba4d173",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5b02bfc1e7e3811c5bf7f0fa626a0694d0dbbd77",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.6.73",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.6.72",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.7"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.7",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.73",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.117",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.61",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\novl: always encode the origin fh when index is enabled\n\nOn an overlay with index=on,nfs_export=on, copy up of a directory\ncrashes the kernel once an LSM has started to deny CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH\nto the mounter, the task that mounted the overlay. The mount and the LSM\npolicy change require root. After that, any user who can write to a\ndirectory that exists only in a lower layer triggers the oops by doing\nso.\n\nBefore a file or directory that exists only in a lower layer is changed\nfor the first time, overlayfs copies it to the writable upper layer.\nThis is called copy up.\n\nOn copy up, ovl_get_origin_fh() encodes the file handle of the lower\ninode, called the origin. It returns NULL if ovl_can_decode_fh() says\nthat the lower filesystem cannot decode handles. Whether the callers can\nhandle NULL depends on the index option:\n\n- Without an index, NULL is fine: the callers store an empty origin\n  xattr.\n- With index enabled, overlayfs keeps entries for copied up inodes in an\n  internal index directory. The name of an index entry is derived from\n  the handle, so ovl_get_origin_fh() must return a handle or an error.\n\nThe mount only enables the index if ovl_can_decode_fh() succeeds for all\nlayers, but the result can change later. The function checks the export\noperations of the filesystem and capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH). Copy up\nruns with the mounter\u0027s credentials, and an LSM can start to deny the\ncapability to those credentials after the mount. ovl_get_origin_fh()\nthen returns NULL with index enabled.\n\nThis goes wrong in two callers:\n\n- With nfs_export=on, copy up of a directory creates an index entry for\n  the directory. ovl_create_index() passes the NULL handle to\n  ovl_get_index_name_fh(), which dereferences it.\n- If the result changes while mount(2) is still running,\n  ovl_get_indexdir() passes a NULL from ovl_get_origin_fh() to\n  ovl_verify_set_fh() in the same way.\n\nBefore the commit in the Fixes tag, these two callers encoded the handle\nthemselves, without consulting ovl_can_decode_fh().\n\nReproduced with a BPF LSM program that started to deny the capability\nafter the mount. An unprivileged touch in a directory that had not been\ncopied up yet oopsed in ovl_get_index_name_fh(). With this patch the\ntouch succeeds and the directory gets its index entry.\n\nFix this by calling ovl_can_decode_fh() in ovl_get_origin_fh() only when\nindex is disabled."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99421",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:17:54.990",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:17:54.990",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1795ca6571199008f67afa9e88cddf199ddde9ca"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a58c0d62bd23173dee3f337f623d3e14b6c9dd4"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ccb1e71dfea95a9789967c34d68a2b7c048303e"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/949f9d8a5580c77a45fa759123367682aba4d173"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b050952bc4e3409c655a4abcd987131bd77ef570"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.