FKIE_CVE-2026-99386

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:17 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: don't resurrect an exiting tcon from cached dir workers cfids_laundromat_worker() bumps tcon->tc_count for every expired open cfid and queues cached_dir_offload_close() without checking whether the tcon is already being torn down. Racing with the final cifs_put_tcon(), the tcon comes back from zero and gets torn down twice: T1 T2 cifs_put_tcon() --tc_count == 0, TID_EXITING tconInfoFree() free_cached_dirs() cancel_delayed_work_sync() cfids_laundromat_worker() ++tc_count == 1 queue_work(serverclose_wq) kfree(tcon->origin_fullpath) kfree(tcon) cached_dir_offload_close() close_cached_dir() [UAF] cifs_put_tcon() tconInfoFree() [double free] cached_dir_lease_break() also bumps tc_count without tc_lock, racing with the laundromat's locked update. Take the tcon reference through a helper that refuses once the tcon is TID_EXITING or its refcount has dropped to zero. Queued put_work and close_work then always hold a tcon reference, so tconInfoFree() can't run before they finish and free_cached_dirs() doesn't need to flush any workqueue. If the laundromat can't get a reference, put the cfid back on the dying list for free_cached_dirs() to free; its handle goes away with the tree connection. The lease break path finds the tcon on ses->tcon_list under cifs_tcp_ses_lock, so it can't see TID_EXITING, but it now takes tc_lock.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "d1b779a4b5acf9a8692b7f002bf6d98e0597cc86",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "548812afd96982a76a93ba76c0582ea670c40d9e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b304a9268f7d54eb75ce62f75013c9a90eabf084",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3fa640d035e5ae526769615c35cb9ed4be6e3662",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ed62849db326dc166aa18496e40f27a44b2c7ad0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3fa640d035e5ae526769615c35cb9ed4be6e3662",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "d58e7b40908a8a57755811d5b37af1df3380278f",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3fa640d035e5ae526769615c35cb9ed4be6e3662",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "73934e535cffbda1490fa97d82690a0f9aa73e94",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ff4528bbc82d0d90073751f7b49e7b9e9c7e5638",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.12.117",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.12.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.7",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.6.64",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.12",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.11.11",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.13"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.13",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.117",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.61",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: don\u0027t resurrect an exiting tcon from cached dir workers\n\ncfids_laundromat_worker() bumps tcon-\u003etc_count for every expired open\ncfid and queues cached_dir_offload_close() without checking whether the\ntcon is already being torn down.  Racing with the final cifs_put_tcon(),\nthe tcon comes back from zero and gets torn down twice:\n\n  T1                                  T2\n  cifs_put_tcon()\n   --tc_count == 0, TID_EXITING\n   tconInfoFree()\n    free_cached_dirs()\n     cancel_delayed_work_sync()       cfids_laundromat_worker()\n                                       ++tc_count == 1\n                                       queue_work(serverclose_wq)\n    kfree(tcon-\u003eorigin_fullpath)\n    kfree(tcon)\n                                      cached_dir_offload_close()\n                                       close_cached_dir()  [UAF]\n                                       cifs_put_tcon()\n                                        tconInfoFree()     [double free]\n\ncached_dir_lease_break() also bumps tc_count without tc_lock, racing with\nthe laundromat\u0027s locked update.\n\nTake the tcon reference through a helper that refuses once the tcon is\nTID_EXITING or its refcount has dropped to zero.  Queued put_work and\nclose_work then always hold a tcon reference, so tconInfoFree() can\u0027t\nrun before they finish and free_cached_dirs() doesn\u0027t need to flush any\nworkqueue.  If the laundromat can\u0027t get a reference, put the cfid back on\nthe dying list for free_cached_dirs() to free; its handle goes away with\nthe tree connection.\n\nThe lease break path finds the tcon on ses-\u003etcon_list under\ncifs_tcp_ses_lock, so it can\u0027t see TID_EXITING, but it now takes tc_lock."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99386",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:17:50.837",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:17:50.837",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b304a9268f7d54eb75ce62f75013c9a90eabf084"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1b779a4b5acf9a8692b7f002bf6d98e0597cc86"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d58e7b40908a8a57755811d5b37af1df3380278f"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed62849db326dc166aa18496e40f27a44b2c7ad0"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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