FKIE_CVE-2026-99381

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:17 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: reject short or out-of-range FIND response parameters CIFSFindFirst() and CIFSFindNext() read the SearchHandle, SearchCount, EndofSearch and LastNameOffset of a TRANS2_FIND_FIRST2 or TRANS2_FIND_NEXT2 response at ParameterOffset. validate_t2() bounds the offset at 1024 and ParameterCount below 512, and nothing compares them with the number of bytes SendReceive() copied into the buffer or with the size of the response parameters. smb_init() places the request and the response in the same cifs_request allocation and cifs_buf_get() clears only the start of it, so a short response with a ParameterOffset past its end has the search handle, the entry count, the end-of-search flag and the last-entry offset read out of the request that was just sent, or out of whatever the allocation held before, and a ParameterCount smaller than the parameters has them read past the end of the parameter block. The reads stay inside the allocation, but what they return is not part of the response, and CIFSFindFirst() then hands back a search handle the server never sent. That handle is sent back to the server in the next FIND_NEXT2 or FIND_CLOSE2, so two bytes of the buffer leak at an offset the server picks. SMB1 is not negotiated by default; reaching this code requires an explicit vers=1.0 mount. Reject a response whose parameter area is smaller than the response parameters or extends past the received length, returning smb_EIO2() with a new smb_eio_traces value for each of the two responses, like the other response checks this file gained since v6.19. Backports to trees before v6.19 need smb_EIO2() replaced with -EINVAL and the trace.h hunk dropped. A conforming server is not affected. The parameter block of a transaction response is part of the SMB, so ParameterOffset + ParameterCount cannot exceed the smbCalcSize() bytes that SendReceive() copies, and the response parameters are 10 bytes for FIND_FIRST2 and 8 bytes for FIND_NEXT2, which is what T2_FFIRST_RSP_PARMS and T2_FNEXT_RSP_PARMS hold. This patch depends on "smb: client: reject FIND data areas that run past the received response", whose declarations it extends.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c",
            "fs/smb/client/trace.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1374082f0897c95610190dfacce463904ec11ea2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "531aa4239b0d80d7146b102b98f7aa7da989ccdd",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c",
            "fs/smb/client/trace.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.6.12"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.6.12",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: reject short or out-of-range FIND response parameters\n\nCIFSFindFirst() and CIFSFindNext() read the SearchHandle, SearchCount,\nEndofSearch and LastNameOffset of a TRANS2_FIND_FIRST2 or\nTRANS2_FIND_NEXT2 response at ParameterOffset. validate_t2() bounds\nthe offset at 1024 and ParameterCount below 512, and nothing compares\nthem with the number of bytes SendReceive() copied into the buffer or\nwith the size of the response parameters. smb_init() places the\nrequest and the response in the same cifs_request allocation and\ncifs_buf_get() clears only the start of it, so a short response with a\nParameterOffset past its end has the search handle, the entry count,\nthe end-of-search flag and the last-entry offset read out of the\nrequest that was just sent, or out of whatever the allocation held\nbefore, and a ParameterCount smaller than the parameters has them read\npast the end of the parameter block. The reads stay inside the\nallocation, but what they return is not part of the response, and\nCIFSFindFirst() then hands back a search handle the server never sent.\nThat handle is sent back to the server in the next FIND_NEXT2 or\nFIND_CLOSE2, so two bytes of the buffer leak at an offset the server\npicks.\n\nSMB1 is not negotiated by default; reaching this code requires an\nexplicit vers=1.0 mount.\n\nReject a response whose parameter area is smaller than the response\nparameters or extends past the received length, returning smb_EIO2()\nwith a new smb_eio_traces value for each of the two responses, like\nthe other response checks this file gained since v6.19. Backports to\ntrees before v6.19 need smb_EIO2() replaced with -EINVAL and the\ntrace.h hunk dropped.\n\nA conforming server is not affected. The parameter block of a\ntransaction response is part of the SMB, so ParameterOffset +\nParameterCount cannot exceed the smbCalcSize() bytes that\nSendReceive() copies, and the response parameters are 10 bytes for\nFIND_FIRST2 and 8 bytes for FIND_NEXT2, which is what\nT2_FFIRST_RSP_PARMS and T2_FNEXT_RSP_PARMS hold.\n\nThis patch depends on \"smb: client: reject FIND data areas that run\npast the received response\", whose declarations it extends."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99381",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:17:50.177",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:17:50.177",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1374082f0897c95610190dfacce463904ec11ea2"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/531aa4239b0d80d7146b102b98f7aa7da989ccdd"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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