FKIE_CVE-2026-99369
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:17 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c",
"fs/nfsd/state.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "d568594503a09ed2761fada2117e4fbaa31972e0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3bd64a5ba1719c2bb6cba4493dfd3e23a7653e54",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bbfa823f624d41e85ebca929ac77dc2182cadfed",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3bd64a5ba1719c2bb6cba4493dfd3e23a7653e54",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c",
"fs/nfsd/state.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.10"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.10",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFSD: Destroy a recalled delegation the client does not hold\n\nA client that answers CB_RECALL with NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE or\nNFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID has no record of the delegation, so the\nFREE_STATEID that clears it from cl_revoked never arrives. Every later\nSEQUENCE reply carries SEQ4_STATUS_RECALLABLE_STATE_REVOKED, and the\nclient loops issuing TEST_STATEID.\n\nDestroy such a delegation when it is reaped rather than revoking it\nonto cl_revoked. RFC 8881 Section 20.2.4 completes the recall at the\nreply when its status is neither NFS4_OK nor NFS4ERR_DELAY, so a\nrejected recall leaves nothing to revoke. An administrative revoke\nkeeps that path, since NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED reports it. A destroyed\nstateid returns NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID instead of NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED. A\nclient that rejects the recall but still holds the delegation gets no\nnotice that its state was revoked.\n\nCB_RECALL can outrun the reply that granted the delegation, so honor\na rejection only once the client has seen that grant. Per RFC 8881\nSection 2.10.6.3, retirement of the slot that carried the grant is that\nproof; retry until then, and revoke when the retries lapse."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99369",
"lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:17:48.740",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-19T15:17:48.740",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bbfa823f624d41e85ebca929ac77dc2182cadfed"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d568594503a09ed2761fada2117e4fbaa31972e0"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Nomenclature
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