FKIE_CVE-2026-99223
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-02 16:17 - Updated: 2026-11-03 20:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: make keyring indexes independent of kernel addresses
KEYCTL_READ returns the serial numbers in a keyring in associative-array
traversal order. The first word of the index is a public, deterministic
hash of the type pointer, domain pointer and description. An unprivileged
user can therefore insert keys with known descriptions, predict their
order for each possible KASLR slide, and recover the kernel image address.
On an x86-64 build with 16 MiB alignment, 45 user keys suffice to
distinguish the candidate slides.
Remove the addresses from the whole index, not just its first hash word.
Assign each key type and domain a nonzero 64-bit ID and hash those IDs and
the description with a once-initialized SipHash key. Use the full IDs in
the later index chunks as well. Truncating or hashing the IDs there would
lose the guarantee that distinct type/domain/description tuples have a
differing index bit.
Allocate IDs lazily since private key types need not be registered. Cache
them in the index key so tree walks and copies of an existing index do not
need to dereference a type descriptor that may have been unregistered.
Keep the 32-bit chunk layout and diff_objects() bit offsets consistent,
and retain the separate root slot for keyrings used by recursive search.
The key comparison, permissions and userspace data format are unchanged;
only the address-dependent in-memory ordering is replaced.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/linux/key-type.h",
"include/linux/key.h",
"security/keys/keyring.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "9ebe824d55983c9f063a2c9ef1a08b29812d406f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e108b22999edbc6f431466baf6b2016c19b7ed31",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9f084ef0beb68091e96ab96f0e95579aac8a77f9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8451d4a4c43127c3b9fdf9fc9ff3fea5539a61f9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "13fc051269d670810d9e314061b61c6dd06116a0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "61ac0585d9f4344d3dfb84b5edff1fee7d532897",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "84f7c699f8d139f743c7dc11ef41d085690955bb",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a113eba06bd1183c614d7994864d6e7054140cb9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "de891c73c1cf41ac8de12c07fa2c84d6a912ad0c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/linux/key-type.h",
"include/linux/key.h",
"security/keys/keyring.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.13"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.13",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.273",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.224",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.191",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.161",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.115",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.60",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.14",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.1",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nkeys: make keyring indexes independent of kernel addresses\n\nKEYCTL_READ returns the serial numbers in a keyring in associative-array\ntraversal order. The first word of the index is a public, deterministic\nhash of the type pointer, domain pointer and description. An unprivileged\nuser can therefore insert keys with known descriptions, predict their\norder for each possible KASLR slide, and recover the kernel image address.\nOn an x86-64 build with 16 MiB alignment, 45 user keys suffice to\ndistinguish the candidate slides.\n\nRemove the addresses from the whole index, not just its first hash word.\nAssign each key type and domain a nonzero 64-bit ID and hash those IDs and\nthe description with a once-initialized SipHash key. Use the full IDs in\nthe later index chunks as well. Truncating or hashing the IDs there would\nlose the guarantee that distinct type/domain/description tuples have a\ndiffering index bit.\n\nAllocate IDs lazily since private key types need not be registered. Cache\nthem in the index key so tree walks and copies of an existing index do not\nneed to dereference a type descriptor that may have been unregistered.\nKeep the 32-bit chunk layout and diff_objects() bit offsets consistent,\nand retain the separate root slot for keyrings used by recursive search.\nThe key comparison, permissions and userspace data format are unchanged;\nonly the address-dependent in-memory ordering is replaced."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99223",
"lastModified": "2026-11-03T20:18:27.673",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-02T16:17:46.650",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13fc051269d670810d9e314061b61c6dd06116a0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61ac0585d9f4344d3dfb84b5edff1fee7d532897"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8451d4a4c43127c3b9fdf9fc9ff3fea5539a61f9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84f7c699f8d139f743c7dc11ef41d085690955bb"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ebe824d55983c9f063a2c9ef1a08b29812d406f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f084ef0beb68091e96ab96f0e95579aac8a77f9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a113eba06bd1183c614d7994864d6e7054140cb9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de891c73c1cf41ac8de12c07fa2c84d6a912ad0c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e108b22999edbc6f431466baf6b2016c19b7ed31"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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