FKIE_CVE-2026-99204
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-28 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:21| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmcommon.h",
"fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c",
"fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "03f2fdcc94238a5127ff8a21a4544fd6118cfc7b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "007dce53a29ccffc000ab5373d188f73881390fd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1c1dbaa16d70cf3d6b9b21503fc188f560376866",
"status": "affected",
"version": "007dce53a29ccffc000ab5373d188f73881390fd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c8bc0d0f2ca3df37ef4d9c69ac5fb7d417d9b035",
"status": "affected",
"version": "007dce53a29ccffc000ab5373d188f73881390fd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "403669041cb77bb5ffc5ce92bcfb49b2da3d989d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "007dce53a29ccffc000ab5373d188f73881390fd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "25de9d3b5a81ba7bd52fdc9601f9ea7d1d3d6ae8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "007dce53a29ccffc000ab5373d188f73881390fd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "04d4571c00db61a9664f387752fa05cb3c08a537",
"status": "affected",
"version": "007dce53a29ccffc000ab5373d188f73881390fd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2bc426a32bfb78868c7f76d9547132837b6b5284",
"status": "affected",
"version": "007dce53a29ccffc000ab5373d188f73881390fd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4c435828932bf46f29860e4a0375bcae101b778a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "007dce53a29ccffc000ab5373d188f73881390fd",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmcommon.h",
"fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c",
"fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.26"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.26",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.273",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.224",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.191",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.161",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.115",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.59",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.13",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2/dlm: Protect the recovery list during debugfs reads\n\nRecovery participant records must remain alive while debug_state_print()\nwalks reco.node_data and formats their fields. The formatter holds\ndlm-\u003espinlock, but the recovery participant list is protected by\ndlm_reco_state_lock. In particular, dlm_destroy_recovery_area() detaches\nthe list under dlm_reco_state_lock and frees the detached records after\nreleasing it. A concurrent debugfs open can therefore read freed memory.\n\nProtect the participant traversal and field reads in debug_state_print()\nwith dlm_reco_state_lock, matching the existing list writers. This also\nserializes the traversal against list_add_tail() during recovery-area\ninitialization. Make the existing lock available to the debug code\nthrough dlmcommon.h; the lock remains internal to the OCFS2 DLM module.\n\nRelease dlm-\u003espinlock after formatting the other domain state and before\nacquiring dlm_reco_state_lock, so the debug reader does not nest the two\nlocks. Leave recovery list insertion, detachment and freeing unchanged.\n\nKASAN report as below:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0\n Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810662ef80 by task dlm-state-stres/896\n\n CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 896 Comm: dlm-state-stres Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)\n Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0\n print_report+0xce/0x630\n ? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420\n ? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0\n kasan_report+0xe0/0x110\n ? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0\n debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0\n ? __pfx_debug_state_open+0x10/0x10\n full_proxy_open_regular+0x193/0x310\n do_dentry_open+0x595/0x12d0\n ? __pfx_full_proxy_open_regular+0x10/0x10\n vfs_open_consume+0xd1/0x400\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n path_openat+0x18d0/0x2020\n ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10\n do_file_open+0x21e/0x470\n ? __pfx_do_file_open+0x10/0x10\n ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? alloc_fd+0x3a6/0x6b0\n do_sys_openat2+0xf4/0x1b0\n ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? __fput+0x5b5/0xa60\n __x64_sys_openat+0x136/0x1e0\n ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10\n do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n [Register dump omitted.]\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n Allocated by task 880:\n kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610\n dlm_remaster_locks+0x147/0x1d90\n dlm_do_recovery+0xde1/0x1580\n dlm_recovery_thread+0x109/0x300\n kthread+0x351/0x460\n ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\n Freed by task 880:\n kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60\n __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80\n kfree+0x308/0x580\n dlm_destroy_recovery_area+0x285/0x460\n dlm_remaster_locks+0x17c4/0x1d90\n dlm_do_recovery+0xde1/0x1580\n dlm_recovery_thread+0x109/0x300\n kthread+0x351/0x460\n ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\n The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810662ef80\n which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32\n The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of\n freed 32-byte region [ffff88810662ef80, ffff88810662efa0)\n\n [Page and memory-state dumps omitted.]"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99204",
"lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:21:52.933",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-28T11:17:41.633",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03f2fdcc94238a5127ff8a21a4544fd6118cfc7b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04d4571c00db61a9664f387752fa05cb3c08a537"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c1dbaa16d70cf3d6b9b21503fc188f560376866"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25de9d3b5a81ba7bd52fdc9601f9ea7d1d3d6ae8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2bc426a32bfb78868c7f76d9547132837b6b5284"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/403669041cb77bb5ffc5ce92bcfb49b2da3d989d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c435828932bf46f29860e4a0375bcae101b778a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8bc0d0f2ca3df37ef4d9c69ac5fb7d417d9b035"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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