Vulnerability-Lookup

FKIE_CVE-2026-99185

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-28 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-31 13:17

Severity

8.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firewire: core: fix race condition in split transaction handling For a split transaction, either fw_core_handle_response() or split_transaction_timeout_callback() may manipulate the same transaction entry in the pending transaction list. The return value of timer_delete() is used to determine which function handles the entry. If the transaction is a split transaction and timer_delete() returns zero, the timeout callback may already be running. In this case, the response handler must leave the entry in the list for the timeout callback to remove. A previous code refactoring broke this behavior, introducing a race condition in which both functions could process the same transaction. This could lead to a use-after-free on the transaction initiator side. Fix the regression by ensuring that the response handler does not process the transaction when timer_delete() returns zero. The timeout callback is responsible for removing the entry from the pending transaction list.

References

	URL	Tags
	416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f9f2d6abc40f79e802b4063859eda343043b85c
	416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8caee0e623ca5d56e829032f9ec073c09e4d224

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/firewire/core-transaction.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "a8caee0e623ca5d56e829032f9ec073c09e4d224",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "fa2dc27100768a8a994c377051fa17a47cc66c76",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7f9f2d6abc40f79e802b4063859eda343043b85c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "fa2dc27100768a8a994c377051fa17a47cc66c76",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/firewire/core-transaction.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.19"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.19",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.13",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfirewire: core: fix race condition in split transaction handling\n\nFor a split transaction, either fw_core_handle_response() or\nsplit_transaction_timeout_callback() may manipulate the same transaction\nentry in the pending transaction list. The return value of timer_delete()\nis used to determine which function handles the entry. If the transaction\nis a split transaction and timer_delete() returns zero, the timeout\ncallback may already be running. In this case, the response handler must\nleave the entry in the list for the timeout callback to remove.\n\nA previous code refactoring broke this behavior, introducing a race\ncondition in which both functions could process the same transaction.\nThis could lead to a use-after-free on the transaction initiator side.\n\nFix the regression by ensuring that the response handler does not process\nthe transaction when timer_delete() returns zero. The timeout callback is\nresponsible for removing the entry from the pending transaction list."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99185",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-31T13:17:59.157",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-28T11:17:39.377",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f9f2d6abc40f79e802b4063859eda343043b85c"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8caee0e623ca5d56e829032f9ec073c09e4d224"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}

CVE-2026-99185 (GCVE-0-2026-99185)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-28 10:35 – Updated: 2026-10-31 12:44

Title

firewire: core: fix race condition in split transaction handling

Summary

Severity

8.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Assigner

Linux CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard D 53/100 over 6639 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8caee0e623ca5d56…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f9f2d6abc40f79e8…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: fa2dc27100768a8a994c377051fa17a47cc66c76 , < a8caee0e623ca5d56e829032f9ec073c09e4d224 (git) Affected: fa2dc27100768a8a994c377051fa17a47cc66c76 , < 7f9f2d6abc40f79e802b4063859eda343043b85c (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 6.19 Unaffected: 0 , < 6.19 (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.13 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/firewire/core-transaction.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "a8caee0e623ca5d56e829032f9ec073c09e4d224",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "fa2dc27100768a8a994c377051fa17a47cc66c76",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7f9f2d6abc40f79e802b4063859eda343043b85c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "fa2dc27100768a8a994c377051fa17a47cc66c76",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/firewire/core-transaction.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.19"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.19",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.13",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.13",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfirewire: core: fix race condition in split transaction handling\n\nFor a split transaction, either fw_core_handle_response() or\nsplit_transaction_timeout_callback() may manipulate the same transaction\nentry in the pending transaction list. The return value of timer_delete()\nis used to determine which function handles the entry. If the transaction\nis a split transaction and timer_delete() returns zero, the timeout\ncallback may already be running. In this case, the response handler must\nleave the entry in the list for the timeout callback to remove.\n\nA previous code refactoring broke this behavior, introducing a race\ncondition in which both functions could process the same transaction.\nThis could lead to a use-after-free on the transaction initiator side.\n\nFix the regression by ensuring that the response handler does not process\nthe transaction when timer_delete() returns zero. The timeout callback is\nresponsible for removing the entry from the pending transaction list."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 8.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:A - An IEEE-1394 peer supplies ACK_PENDING and a matching asynchronous response; OHCI irq_handler() queues handle_ar_packet(), which passes the attacker-chosen source/tlabel to the patched fw_core_handle_response(), requiring access to the shared FireWire bus.\nAC:L - ACK_PENDING makes transmit_complete_callback() arm split_timeout_timer, and the same peer can withhold then send the matching response at expiry, repeatedly racing timer_delete() against split_transaction_timeout_callback(); both competing events are attacker-driven.\nPR:N - fw_core_handle_response() accepts an OHCI-delivered response based only on source node ID and tlabel, while fw_device_init() automatically creates transactions for configuration-ROM reads; no credentials, capability, or authentication check gates the peer.\nUI:N - fw_node_event(FW_NODE_CREATED) schedules fw_device_init(), which calls read_config_rom() and fw_run_transaction() automatically; operating or attaching the malicious peer is the attacker\u0027s action, and no victim must open /dev/fw* or initiate I/O.\nS:U - The competing handlers corrupt fw_transaction and initiator objects inside the host kernel that owns them; no guest-host, IOMMU, sandbox, or other security-authority boundary is crossed.\nC:H - One SBP-2 completion can make complete_agent_reset_write_no_wait() free t while the competing path still reads t-\u003epacket, t-\u003ecallback, and t-\u003ecallback_data; reclaiming this dangling slab object gives the UAF leverage needed to read arbitrary kernel memory.\nI:H - complete_agent_reset_write_no_wait() calls kfree(t) on the first completion, while the second can double-free the object or invoke the stale t-\u003ecallback after slab reuse, providing heap corruption and an indirect-call control-flow-hijack primitive.\nA:H - The duplicate completion can double-free the SBP-2 reset transaction or invoke a callback through reclaimed memory, causing SLUB corruption, an oops, or a kernel panic; the peer can retrigger the race with additional split transactions."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-31T12:44:55.216Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8caee0e623ca5d56e829032f9ec073c09e4d224"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f9f2d6abc40f79e802b4063859eda343043b85c"
        }
      ],
      "title": "firewire: core: fix race condition in split transaction handling",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-99185",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-28T10:35:43.282Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.399Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-31T12:44:55.216Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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