FKIE_CVE-2026-99184

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-28 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-28 11:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/rocket: search every core slot when a core is removed rocket_remove() decrements rdev->num_cores for each core it removes, while find_core_for_dev() searches slots 0 to num_cores - 1. Unbinding the cores in the order they were bound therefore loses the last one: by the time it is removed the search range has already shrunk past its slot, so find_core_for_dev() returns -1 and rocket_remove() gives up without doing anything. num_cores never reaches zero, rocket_device_fini() never runs, and the file-scoped rdev keeps pointing at a device that is going away. Binding the cores again starts from that stale count, because rocket_probe() takes rdev->num_cores as the slot to fill. On an RK3588, which describes three cores, the second round lands on slots 1, 2 and 3 while rdev->cores was allocated with room for three: rocket fdab0000.npu: Rockchip NPU core 1 version: 1179210309 rocket fdac0000.npu: Rockchip NPU core 2 version: 1179210309 rocket fdad0000.npu: Rockchip NPU core 3 version: 1179210309 The write to rdev->cores[3] is past the end of the array. Nothing in tree reads the core array often enough to notice, so the overrun is silent today. It turned up while testing a devfreq series on top of this, where a worker walks every core a few times a second, and UBSAN caught the first bool it read out of the overrun entry: UBSAN: invalid-load in drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_devfreq.c:47:10 load of value 5 is not a valid value for type '_Bool' Workqueue: devfreq_wq devfreq_monitor Record how many slots were allocated and search all of them. Every core is then found on removal, num_cores reaches zero, the device is torn down and a later bind starts from a clean rdev. This does not make unbinding a single core out of several work. probe still takes num_cores as the slot to fill, so rebinding one core while its siblings stay bound would write over a slot that is already in use, and rocket_open() still reaches for cores[0] whether or not anything is there. Both of those want more thought than a fix should carry. Found by unbinding and rebinding all three cores on an Orange Pi 5 Plus. With this applied, 25 unbind/rebind rounds and 5 module unload/reload rounds run clean there: the cores land in slots 0, 1 and 2 every time, whichever order they are bound in, and the shared supply goes back to a single user after each round.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/134451cf95cb6aa04b725fbfa04e878d072756f5
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5078c91f5c84bb383d0a10ed39856f98575e39cf
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6eff1d69dae808a1518aee5a58d0853a8db3f1be
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_device.c",
            "drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_device.h",
            "drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_drv.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "5078c91f5c84bb383d0a10ed39856f98575e39cf",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ed98261b41687323ffa02ca20fef1e60b38fd1aa",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "134451cf95cb6aa04b725fbfa04e878d072756f5",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ed98261b41687323ffa02ca20fef1e60b38fd1aa",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6eff1d69dae808a1518aee5a58d0853a8db3f1be",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ed98261b41687323ffa02ca20fef1e60b38fd1aa",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_device.c",
            "drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_device.h",
            "drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_drv.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.18"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.18",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.59",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.13",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naccel/rocket: search every core slot when a core is removed\n\nrocket_remove() decrements rdev-\u003enum_cores for each core it removes,\nwhile find_core_for_dev() searches slots 0 to num_cores - 1. Unbinding\nthe cores in the order they were bound therefore loses the last one: by\nthe time it is removed the search range has already shrunk past its\nslot, so find_core_for_dev() returns -1 and rocket_remove() gives up\nwithout doing anything.\n\nnum_cores never reaches zero, rocket_device_fini() never runs, and the\nfile-scoped rdev keeps pointing at a device that is going away. Binding\nthe cores again starts from that stale count, because rocket_probe()\ntakes rdev-\u003enum_cores as the slot to fill. On an RK3588, which describes\nthree cores, the second round lands on slots 1, 2 and 3 while rdev-\u003ecores\nwas allocated with room for three:\n\n  rocket fdab0000.npu: Rockchip NPU core 1 version: 1179210309\n  rocket fdac0000.npu: Rockchip NPU core 2 version: 1179210309\n  rocket fdad0000.npu: Rockchip NPU core 3 version: 1179210309\n\nThe write to rdev-\u003ecores[3] is past the end of the array.\n\nNothing in tree reads the core array often enough to notice, so the\noverrun is silent today. It turned up while testing a devfreq series on\ntop of this, where a worker walks every core a few times a second, and\nUBSAN caught the first bool it read out of the overrun entry:\n\n  UBSAN: invalid-load in drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_devfreq.c:47:10\n  load of value 5 is not a valid value for type \u0027_Bool\u0027\n  Workqueue: devfreq_wq devfreq_monitor\n\nRecord how many slots were allocated and search all of them. Every core\nis then found on removal, num_cores reaches zero, the device is torn down\nand a later bind starts from a clean rdev.\n\nThis does not make unbinding a single core out of several work. probe\nstill takes num_cores as the slot to fill, so rebinding one core while\nits siblings stay bound would write over a slot that is already in use,\nand rocket_open() still reaches for cores[0] whether or not anything is\nthere. Both of those want more thought than a fix should carry.\n\nFound by unbinding and rebinding all three cores on an Orange Pi 5 Plus.\nWith this applied, 25 unbind/rebind rounds and 5 module unload/reload\nrounds run clean there: the cores land in slots 0, 1 and 2 every time,\nwhichever order they are bound in, and the shared supply goes back to a\nsingle user after each round."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99184",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-28T11:17:39.243",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-10-28T11:17:39.243",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/134451cf95cb6aa04b725fbfa04e878d072756f5"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5078c91f5c84bb383d0a10ed39856f98575e39cf"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6eff1d69dae808a1518aee5a58d0853a8db3f1be"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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