FKIE_CVE-2026-99183

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-28 11:17 - Updated: 2026-11-06 18:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/rocket: search every core slot when looking up a scheduler sched_to_core() walks rdev->cores[] up to rdev->num_cores, and rocket_remove() decrements num_cores for every core it removes. Unbind a core that is not the last one and the cores behind it fall outside the search, so sched_to_core() returns NULL for a core that is still bound and still running jobs. Neither caller checks the result: rocket_job_run(): rocket_fence_create(core), core->dev rocket_job_timedout(): dev_err(core->dev, "NPU job timed out") Unbinding the middle core of the three on an RK3588 while three clients are submitting to all of them faults twice, once from the surviving core's job queue and once from its reset work: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000220-0x0000000000000227] Workqueue: fdad0000.npu drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] pc : rocket_job_run+0x234/0x838 [rocket] Call trace: rocket_job_run+0x234/0x838 [rocket] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x2cc/0xad8 [gpu_sched] process_one_work+0x640/0x14f0 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] Workqueue: rocket-reset-2 drm_sched_job_timedout [gpu_sched] pc : rocket_job_timedout+0xf0/0x1e0 [rocket] Call trace: rocket_job_timedout+0xf0/0x1e0 [rocket] drm_sched_job_timedout+0x188/0x6a0 [gpu_sched] Both are the third core: the workqueue names are its device and its core->index, and it was left at slot 2 while num_cores had dropped to 2. Search all the slots that were allocated, the way find_core_for_dev() now does. A core that is still bound is then found, and the two callers get the pointer they already assume they have. This does not make unbinding one core out of several safe. An open client keeps an entity pointing at the scheduler of the core that went away: drm_sched reports it as not ready for every job that lands on it, and the client waits in dma_fence_default_wait for a fence that will never signal. Stopping the NULL dereference is what belongs in a fix; the rest wants more thought.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16c95870c95f2a3d78c81b9fbc0645f4b7178c11
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89c2c777df17eb0201c8e22afabbf3691f2a28fe
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c137756469d5bcc79e97beb406ae4d14b9585463
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_job.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "16c95870c95f2a3d78c81b9fbc0645f4b7178c11",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0810d5ad88a18f1e6d549853a388ad0316f74e36",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c137756469d5bcc79e97beb406ae4d14b9585463",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0810d5ad88a18f1e6d549853a388ad0316f74e36",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "89c2c777df17eb0201c8e22afabbf3691f2a28fe",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0810d5ad88a18f1e6d549853a388ad0316f74e36",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_job.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.18"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.18",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.61",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.13",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naccel/rocket: search every core slot when looking up a scheduler\n\nsched_to_core() walks rdev-\u003ecores[] up to rdev-\u003enum_cores, and\nrocket_remove() decrements num_cores for every core it removes. Unbind a\ncore that is not the last one and the cores behind it fall outside the\nsearch, so sched_to_core() returns NULL for a core that is still bound and\nstill running jobs. Neither caller checks the result:\n\n  rocket_job_run():      rocket_fence_create(core), core-\u003edev\n  rocket_job_timedout(): dev_err(core-\u003edev, \"NPU job timed out\")\n\nUnbinding the middle core of the three on an RK3588 while three clients are\nsubmitting to all of them faults twice, once from the surviving core\u0027s\njob queue and once from its reset work:\n\n  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000220-0x0000000000000227]\n  Workqueue: fdad0000.npu drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]\n  pc : rocket_job_run+0x234/0x838 [rocket]\n  Call trace:\n   rocket_job_run+0x234/0x838 [rocket]\n   drm_sched_run_job_work+0x2cc/0xad8 [gpu_sched]\n   process_one_work+0x640/0x14f0\n\n  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]\n  Workqueue: rocket-reset-2 drm_sched_job_timedout [gpu_sched]\n  pc : rocket_job_timedout+0xf0/0x1e0 [rocket]\n  Call trace:\n   rocket_job_timedout+0xf0/0x1e0 [rocket]\n   drm_sched_job_timedout+0x188/0x6a0 [gpu_sched]\n\nBoth are the third core: the workqueue names are its device and its\ncore-\u003eindex, and it was left at slot 2 while num_cores had dropped to 2.\n\nSearch all the slots that were allocated, the way find_core_for_dev() now\ndoes. A core that is still bound is then found, and the two callers get\nthe pointer they already assume they have.\n\nThis does not make unbinding one core out of several safe. An open client\nkeeps an entity pointing at the scheduler of the core that went away:\ndrm_sched reports it as not ready for every job that lands on it, and the\nclient waits in dma_fence_default_wait for a fence that will never signal.\nStopping the NULL dereference is what belongs in a fix; the rest wants\nmore thought."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99183",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-06T18:18:32.180",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-10-28T11:17:39.123",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16c95870c95f2a3d78c81b9fbc0645f4b7178c11"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89c2c777df17eb0201c8e22afabbf3691f2a28fe"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c137756469d5bcc79e97beb406ae4d14b9585463"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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