FKIE_CVE-2026-99175
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-28 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:21| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/notify/mark.c",
"include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "f7def717c06aea7004905e4d1568c3691ef9825d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6b3f05d24d355f50f3d9814304650fcab0efb482",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "da2f9aa89ef1b1fe7a7c6e1a8ddacd9c975e86aa",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6b3f05d24d355f50f3d9814304650fcab0efb482",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "587d80966dcce2824f13fd32dab83bf882acf66f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6b3f05d24d355f50f3d9814304650fcab0efb482",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d28a460a2237220d9ccbdd3baac6eaead44e96cb",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6b3f05d24d355f50f3d9814304650fcab0efb482",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "61133f15773b907bada651a02d9c6d38eae37c48",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6b3f05d24d355f50f3d9814304650fcab0efb482",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "952501bfc6e5e654ac4a17ec9d90c1ec614bd9f1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6b3f05d24d355f50f3d9814304650fcab0efb482",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "472589eacdf10b5f9bd10b333957ed5291b2544b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6b3f05d24d355f50f3d9814304650fcab0efb482",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "36ebddca56b9d8993d6dc984fdecc748ee1f5e06",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6b3f05d24d355f50f3d9814304650fcab0efb482",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/notify/mark.c",
"include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.12"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.12",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.273",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.224",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.191",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.161",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.115",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.59",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.13",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfsnotify: prevent mark additions during connector teardown\n\nfsnotify_destroy_marks() keeps a reference to its current mark while it\ndrops conn-\u003elock to destroy the mark. This stabilizes the forward-walk\ncursor, but does not prevent a new mark from being inserted before it.\nFor example, an inotify watch re-added after IN_IGNORED sorts before the\nold, detached mark for the same group. The walk can miss the replacement\nand then detach the entire connector from the object.\n\nThe replacement is still on its group\u0027s marks_list and, for inotify, in\nthe watch IDR. The group mutex no longer protects the connector\u0027s object\nfrom disappearing. An unprivileged fdinfo read racing the final detach\ncan consequently call igrab(NULL):\n\n BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in igrab+0x24/0x100\n Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000148\n Call Trace:\n igrab+0x24/0x100\n inotify_show_fdinfo+0x1dc/0x5e0\n seq_show+0x397/0x690\n\nSet a DESTROYING flag under conn-\u003elock before starting the walk, and\nreject new marks on that connector with -ENOENT. The existing add-mark\nerror paths undo the temporary group-list entry and the backend\u0027s watch\nallocation. Do not wait for teardown while holding the group mutex,\nwhich the destroyer needs. Once the old connector is detached, an add\ncan install a fresh connector as before.\n\nThis closes the insertion race for all object types using the common\nconnector teardown, without changing the mark reference or SRCU lifetime\nrules."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99175",
"lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:21:51.120",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-28T11:17:38.150",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36ebddca56b9d8993d6dc984fdecc748ee1f5e06"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/472589eacdf10b5f9bd10b333957ed5291b2544b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/587d80966dcce2824f13fd32dab83bf882acf66f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61133f15773b907bada651a02d9c6d38eae37c48"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/952501bfc6e5e654ac4a17ec9d90c1ec614bd9f1"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d28a460a2237220d9ccbdd3baac6eaead44e96cb"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da2f9aa89ef1b1fe7a7c6e1a8ddacd9c975e86aa"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7def717c06aea7004905e4d1568c3691ef9825d"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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