FKIE_CVE-2026-99038
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-23 13:17 - Updated: 2026-10-23 13:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them
memstick_check() can pass its host->removing check just before
rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then
silently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject
is set, and drv_remove's cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued
handle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes
card->mrq_complete.
Once memstick core waits for requests without a timeout ("memstick: core:
wait for request completion before freeing card"), this hangs removal:
memstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in
flush_workqueue():
INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds.
Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check
__wait_for_common
memstick_check
INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds.
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
__flush_workqueue
memstick_remove_host
rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove
Never drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req,
and handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without
touching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling
it, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new
request can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host.
The host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves
host->req NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do,
and it would now race with handle_req.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "f2c181e1d58e911804e14543b2f1cc6b23a0d4d6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "99451dceeb5fdd789f0a2eeb3ee029e80d2ccc40",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5b599e28aeb3684772aef64f46cc6f25f4c67128",
"status": "affected",
"version": "99451dceeb5fdd789f0a2eeb3ee029e80d2ccc40",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d7e811c3a49cd5cff529c157df886719e09370ec",
"status": "affected",
"version": "99451dceeb5fdd789f0a2eeb3ee029e80d2ccc40",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5616da0f92339328fa1472876df51555e15ad340",
"status": "affected",
"version": "99451dceeb5fdd789f0a2eeb3ee029e80d2ccc40",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c96ca94425b076dc398d929366e378d1e22ec794",
"status": "affected",
"version": "99451dceeb5fdd789f0a2eeb3ee029e80d2ccc40",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.160",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.113",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.57",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmemstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them\n\nmemstick_check() can pass its host-\u003eremoving check just before\nrtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then\nsilently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject\nis set, and drv_remove\u0027s cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued\nhandle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes\ncard-\u003emrq_complete.\n\nOnce memstick core waits for requests without a timeout (\"memstick: core:\nwait for request completion before freeing card\"), this hangs removal:\nmemstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in\nflush_workqueue():\n\n INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds.\n Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check\n __wait_for_common\n memstick_check\n\n INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds.\n Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event\n __flush_workqueue\n memstick_remove_host\n rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove\n\nNever drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req,\nand handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without\ntouching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling\nit, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new\nrequest can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host.\n\nThe host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves\nhost-\u003ereq NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do,\nand it would now race with handle_req."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99038",
"lastModified": "2026-10-23T13:17:27.067",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-23T13:17:27.067",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5616da0f92339328fa1472876df51555e15ad340"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b599e28aeb3684772aef64f46cc6f25f4c67128"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c96ca94425b076dc398d929366e378d1e22ec794"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7e811c3a49cd5cff529c157df886719e09370ec"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2c181e1d58e911804e14543b2f1cc6b23a0d4d6"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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