FKIE_CVE-2026-99021
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-23 13:17 - Updated: 2026-10-23 13:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regulator: of: fill in supply names in of_regulator_bulk_get_all()
of_regulator_bulk_get_all() returns an array it allocated itself, and
fills in only the consumer of each entry. Every other way of getting a
bulk array has the supply name set, because the caller provides it, and
the core expects it to be there: regulator_bulk_enable() prints it when
a supply fails to enable, so a caller that hands such an array to it
dereferences uninitialised memory on that path.
Copy each name into the array's own allocation, right behind the
entries, so that it shares the array's lifetime and callers still have
nothing extra to free. That also retires the fixed 64 byte stack buffer
the names were assembled in, which is_supply_name() never bounded the
copy against.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/regulator/of_regulator.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "82ac8c4939bdbd064b4f54a580fbe4baf0d60e41",
"status": "affected",
"version": "27b9ecc7a9ba1d0014779bfe5a6dbf630899c6e7",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a3384ec2516a7cc567bd7c09029282494469b247",
"status": "affected",
"version": "27b9ecc7a9ba1d0014779bfe5a6dbf630899c6e7",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e2151c29cec73f6cc70abf1c7cbc7b9b202489f5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "27b9ecc7a9ba1d0014779bfe5a6dbf630899c6e7",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "fd5015686d898db6642e05cfa1cc4e1289631ecb",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.1.110",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/regulator/of_regulator.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.57",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nregulator: of: fill in supply names in of_regulator_bulk_get_all()\n\nof_regulator_bulk_get_all() returns an array it allocated itself, and\nfills in only the consumer of each entry. Every other way of getting a\nbulk array has the supply name set, because the caller provides it, and\nthe core expects it to be there: regulator_bulk_enable() prints it when\na supply fails to enable, so a caller that hands such an array to it\ndereferences uninitialised memory on that path.\n\nCopy each name into the array\u0027s own allocation, right behind the\nentries, so that it shares the array\u0027s lifetime and callers still have\nnothing extra to free. That also retires the fixed 64 byte stack buffer\nthe names were assembled in, which is_supply_name() never bounded the\ncopy against."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99021",
"lastModified": "2026-10-23T13:17:25.013",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-23T13:17:25.013",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/82ac8c4939bdbd064b4f54a580fbe4baf0d60e41"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3384ec2516a7cc567bd7c09029282494469b247"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2151c29cec73f6cc70abf1c7cbc7b9b202489f5"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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