FKIE_CVE-2026-98802

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-18 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seg6: ensure packet data is writable before modifying SRH and IPv6 DA advance_nextseg() modifies the SRH Segments Left field and the IPv6 destination address without ensuring the packet data is writable. seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() has the same problem when it advances the NEXT-C-SID argument in the destination address. The skb may be cloned, for example by an AF_PACKET socket receiving on the ingress device. advance_nextseg() and seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() then write into the packet data shared with the clone. A read from that socket can return the modified packet instead of the received one. The simplified path below shows this for advance_nextseg(): __netif_receive_skb_one_core __netif_receive_skb_core deliver_skb [orig: users=2, cloned=0] packet_rcv skb_clone clone queued to the AF_PACKET socket consume_skb(orig) [orig: users=1, cloned=1] ipv6_rcv ip6_rcv_core skb_share_check: no-op [orig: users=1] [...] input_action_end_core advance_nextseg writes into the data shared with the clone Call skb_ensure_writable() in advance_nextseg() and in seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() before they modify the packet data. skb_ensure_writable() may reallocate skb->head, which invalidates the pointers into the packet data taken before the call. advance_nextseg() now returns a valid SRH pointer, or NULL if skb_ensure_writable() fails. seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() takes the pointer to the destination address from the skb after skb_ensure_writable(). On failure, the callers drop the packet with SKB_DROP_REASON_NOMEM.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ae3f4067ba4ae3a15581392f6dac422e3d3def0
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9141fdb7a2ead48cfcd60c681aba91d3014255b
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/ipv6/seg6_local.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "e9141fdb7a2ead48cfcd60c681aba91d3014255b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "140f04c33bbcf89440dcaf8bef04918abff5a52d",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "8ae3f4067ba4ae3a15581392f6dac422e3d3def0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "140f04c33bbcf89440dcaf8bef04918abff5a52d",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/ipv6/seg6_local.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.14"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.14",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.10",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nseg6: ensure packet data is writable before modifying SRH and IPv6 DA\n\nadvance_nextseg() modifies the SRH Segments Left field and the IPv6\ndestination address without ensuring the packet data is writable.\nseg6_next_csid_advance_arg() has the same problem when it advances the\nNEXT-C-SID argument in the destination address.\n\nThe skb may be cloned, for example by an AF_PACKET socket receiving on\nthe ingress device. advance_nextseg() and seg6_next_csid_advance_arg()\nthen write into the packet data shared with the clone. A read from that\nsocket can return the modified packet instead of the received one. The\nsimplified path below shows this for advance_nextseg():\n\n__netif_receive_skb_one_core\n  __netif_receive_skb_core\n    deliver_skb               [orig: users=2, cloned=0]\n      packet_rcv\n        skb_clone             clone queued to the AF_PACKET socket\n        consume_skb(orig)     [orig: users=1, cloned=1]\n  ipv6_rcv\n    ip6_rcv_core              skb_share_check: no-op [orig: users=1]\n    [...]\n      input_action_end_core\n        advance_nextseg       writes into the data shared with the clone\n\nCall skb_ensure_writable() in advance_nextseg() and in\nseg6_next_csid_advance_arg() before they modify the packet data.\nskb_ensure_writable() may reallocate skb-\u003ehead, which invalidates the\npointers into the packet data taken before the call.\nadvance_nextseg() now returns a valid SRH pointer, or NULL if\nskb_ensure_writable() fails.\nseg6_next_csid_advance_arg() takes the pointer to the destination\naddress from the skb after skb_ensure_writable().\nOn failure, the callers drop the packet with SKB_DROP_REASON_NOMEM."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-98802",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:19:44.260",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-10-18T16:17:34.250",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ae3f4067ba4ae3a15581392f6dac422e3d3def0"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9141fdb7a2ead48cfcd60c681aba91d3014255b"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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