FKIE_CVE-2026-98719
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-18 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Nullify "have run CPUs" mask pointer when freeing it
Nullify have_run_cpus when freeing the mask, particularly in the error path
of __sev_guest_init(), so that KVM doesn't have to subtly use sev->active
to track whether or not the mask has been freed. As pointed out by Sashiko,
blindly freeing the mask in sev_vm_destroy() results in a double-free if
the mask is freed if __sev_guest_init() fails.
Throw the logic in a helper as nullifying the pointer is frustratingly
difficult and weird due to have_run_cpus being a single-entry array when
CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=n. Deliberately don't use CPUMASK_VAR_NULL, as it's not
directly assignable when the cpumask is on-stack, e.g. requires using a
local variable and a memcpy(), which is beyond ridiculous. Furthermore,
while clearing the on-stack bitmask is an unnecessary and arguably unwanted
side effect, KVM absolutely relies on '0' being the "null" value given that
the struct is zero-allocated.
Opportunistically add an alloc() helper to pair with free(); there are just
enough call sites to make doing so worthwhile.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "b1de3ebf59507e0edacaa5cfa2225bc1869e1b63",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6aef7cf800098749ff5d660222efaf6e01e98c09",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0fbc7fec2242de6c3dcea6de55573c428e820173",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9784e5ca91b37b387f3f414af4340c54f7a63566",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8abbc76120a74bfba1851bd97528099d715e45c6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "12c1f6e03f944e399bd2c88441dca5dc702b95a5",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "6.18.56",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18.55",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.2.10",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.2.9",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: SEV: Nullify \"have run CPUs\" mask pointer when freeing it\n\nNullify have_run_cpus when freeing the mask, particularly in the error path\nof __sev_guest_init(), so that KVM doesn\u0027t have to subtly use sev-\u003eactive\nto track whether or not the mask has been freed. As pointed out by Sashiko,\nblindly freeing the mask in sev_vm_destroy() results in a double-free if\nthe mask is freed if __sev_guest_init() fails.\n\nThrow the logic in a helper as nullifying the pointer is frustratingly\ndifficult and weird due to have_run_cpus being a single-entry array when\nCPUMASK_OFFSTACK=n. Deliberately don\u0027t use CPUMASK_VAR_NULL, as it\u0027s not\ndirectly assignable when the cpumask is on-stack, e.g. requires using a\nlocal variable and a memcpy(), which is beyond ridiculous. Furthermore,\nwhile clearing the on-stack bitmask is an unnecessary and arguably unwanted\nside effect, KVM absolutely relies on \u00270\u0027 being the \"null\" value given that\nthe struct is zero-allocated.\n\nOpportunistically add an alloc() helper to pair with free(); there are just\nenough call sites to make doing so worthwhile."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98719",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:19:36.137",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-18T16:17:25.463",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fbc7fec2242de6c3dcea6de55573c428e820173"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8abbc76120a74bfba1851bd97528099d715e45c6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1de3ebf59507e0edacaa5cfa2225bc1869e1b63"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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