FKIE_CVE-2026-98682
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-18 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: drain and invalidate before server-side copy/clone
cifs_file_copychunk_range() and the clone (FICLONE) path of
cifs_remap_file_range() do not serialise the destination page cache
against the server-side copy the way the other server-side range
operations (smb3_zero_range(), smb3_punch_hole(), smb3_collapse_range()
and smb3_insert_range()) do.
cifs_file_copychunk_range() invalidates the destination range with
filemap_invalidate_inode(), which takes and drops the mapping's
invalidate_lock internally, so the lock is no longer held when the
copychunk ioctl is issued. It also never drains in-flight netfs I/O on
the target. The clone path never takes the invalidate_lock at all (only
i_rwsem), uses a bare truncate_inode_pages_range() and likewise does not
drain outstanding I/O.
As a result an asynchronous destination writeback can complete after the
server-side copy/clone has run and reinstate stale data over the region
just written by the server, corrupting the file. This is the same class
of corruption as commit d7d2adcd022b ("smb/client: flush dirty data
before punching a hole") and has been seen randomly in generic/363
against Windows Server.
Fix both paths to follow the established ordering: hold the target
mapping's invalidate_lock across the flush and invalidation of the
destination and the server ioctl, and call netfs_wait_for_outstanding_io()
on the target to drain in-flight writes before the ioctl is issued. Only
the target inode's invalidate_lock is required, as the source is merely
flushed and not invalidated; i_rwsem (already held via
lock_two_nondirectories()) is acquired before the invalidate_lock,
matching the VFS lock ordering. Since filemap_invalidate_inode() takes
that same lock internally, replace it with its own unmap/flush/invalidate
steps instead of calling it, and return early on a zero-length copy to
avoid a range underflow.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "dc71660f11ef2fecc0695a41e49cd496a9d255ab",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c54fc3a4f375663f2361a9cbb2955fb4ef912879",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c9b1194e8ec99d95db25db45edd2fbf690f043ab",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c54fc3a4f375663f2361a9cbb2955fb4ef912879",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "358bd5f436d820bb758833050aae065b35d6986c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "43801359c8971cc49b4a4db5015fba77fbd09c32",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.1.68",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6.7",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.7"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.10",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: drain and invalidate before server-side copy/clone\n\ncifs_file_copychunk_range() and the clone (FICLONE) path of\ncifs_remap_file_range() do not serialise the destination page cache\nagainst the server-side copy the way the other server-side range\noperations (smb3_zero_range(), smb3_punch_hole(), smb3_collapse_range()\nand smb3_insert_range()) do.\n\ncifs_file_copychunk_range() invalidates the destination range with\nfilemap_invalidate_inode(), which takes and drops the mapping\u0027s\ninvalidate_lock internally, so the lock is no longer held when the\ncopychunk ioctl is issued. It also never drains in-flight netfs I/O on\nthe target. The clone path never takes the invalidate_lock at all (only\ni_rwsem), uses a bare truncate_inode_pages_range() and likewise does not\ndrain outstanding I/O.\n\nAs a result an asynchronous destination writeback can complete after the\nserver-side copy/clone has run and reinstate stale data over the region\njust written by the server, corrupting the file. This is the same class\nof corruption as commit d7d2adcd022b (\"smb/client: flush dirty data\nbefore punching a hole\") and has been seen randomly in generic/363\nagainst Windows Server.\n\nFix both paths to follow the established ordering: hold the target\nmapping\u0027s invalidate_lock across the flush and invalidation of the\ndestination and the server ioctl, and call netfs_wait_for_outstanding_io()\non the target to drain in-flight writes before the ioctl is issued. Only\nthe target inode\u0027s invalidate_lock is required, as the source is merely\nflushed and not invalidated; i_rwsem (already held via\nlock_two_nondirectories()) is acquired before the invalidate_lock,\nmatching the VFS lock ordering. Since filemap_invalidate_inode() takes\nthat same lock internally, replace it with its own unmap/flush/invalidate\nsteps instead of calling it, and return early on a zero-length copy to\navoid a range underflow."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98682",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:19:32.627",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-18T16:17:21.557",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9b1194e8ec99d95db25db45edd2fbf690f043ab"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc71660f11ef2fecc0695a41e49cd496a9d255ab"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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