FKIE_CVE-2026-98600
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-18 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Reject short EA=0 frames in rfcomm_recv_frame()
While rfcomm_recv_frame() verifies that skb->len is at least
sizeof(*hdr) + 1 (4 bytes: 3-byte header + 1-byte FCS), an RFCOMM frame
with an extended 2-byte length field (!__test_ea(hdr->len)) has a 4-byte
header plus a 1-byte FCS (5 bytes minimum, sizeof(*hdr) + 2).
When a 4-byte RFCOMM frame with EA == 0 arrives:
1. The initial skb->len < sizeof(*hdr) + 1 check passes (4 < 4 is false).
2. Trimming the FCS byte decrements skb->len to 3.
3. If __check_fcs() succeeds, skb_pull(skb, 4) fails (4 > 3) and returns
NULL without advancing skb->data.
4. Because the return value of skb_pull() is ignored, the un-pulled
3-byte struct rfcomm_hdr remains at skb->data and is either queued as
application payload via rfcomm_recv_data() or parsed as a multiplexer
control command via rfcomm_recv_mcc() on DLCI 0.
Fix this by extending the length check in rfcomm_recv_frame() to also
require skb->len >= sizeof(*hdr) + 2 when !__test_ea(hdr->len).
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "76876fd26569302d26d91cbe8b75fa8e66cf8969",
"status": "affected",
"version": "fb40eda15122f6b780228639c1ead6820340ff54",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "97711b964877242933484989224a3c4c5d88a5ee",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3829af5fab5a22405bf1e7d69068c2ec0fce46ca",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7a1781a2f3a9667b3065d402d1f11986a2363e08",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b161eacd7fa4a2d765724b5504ac6cc388e48f80",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c25587fa26761e623198b4f47151fe79d09ccde6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "30d1d9f3495463f7c026e4c553127f79b486fcd6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "71ccacde407b7d8f0ef48974a0d2524602fd5c44",
"status": "affected",
"version": "67dc3b40fae71b6b11c71e7ff69bac0758818c05",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "be00deee60044ffa820f9436415caeb665b2cda0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "bbc310caa2b6bf5fe42896ba27da0fbc12e4ac51",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9240fc1f2cde5331c61608da21b00394602ca762",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b230e5bf501c5edaf2eb0991cb862ac142031d4b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6d91041bb38b97e2feb625123cc0529d7b83a0e1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b230e5bf501c5edaf2eb0991cb862ac142031d4b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.12.112",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.12.111",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.18.55",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.55",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.9",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: RFCOMM: Reject short EA=0 frames in rfcomm_recv_frame()\n\nWhile rfcomm_recv_frame() verifies that skb-\u003elen is at least\nsizeof(*hdr) + 1 (4 bytes: 3-byte header + 1-byte FCS), an RFCOMM frame\nwith an extended 2-byte length field (!__test_ea(hdr-\u003elen)) has a 4-byte\nheader plus a 1-byte FCS (5 bytes minimum, sizeof(*hdr) + 2).\n\nWhen a 4-byte RFCOMM frame with EA == 0 arrives:\n1. The initial skb-\u003elen \u003c sizeof(*hdr) + 1 check passes (4 \u003c 4 is false).\n2. Trimming the FCS byte decrements skb-\u003elen to 3.\n3. If __check_fcs() succeeds, skb_pull(skb, 4) fails (4 \u003e 3) and returns\n NULL without advancing skb-\u003edata.\n4. Because the return value of skb_pull() is ignored, the un-pulled\n 3-byte struct rfcomm_hdr remains at skb-\u003edata and is either queued as\n application payload via rfcomm_recv_data() or parsed as a multiplexer\n control command via rfcomm_recv_mcc() on DLCI 0.\n\nFix this by extending the length check in rfcomm_recv_frame() to also\nrequire skb-\u003elen \u003e= sizeof(*hdr) + 2 when !__test_ea(hdr-\u003elen)."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98600",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:19:21.517",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-18T16:17:12.707",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d91041bb38b97e2feb625123cc0529d7b83a0e1"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71ccacde407b7d8f0ef48974a0d2524602fd5c44"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76876fd26569302d26d91cbe8b75fa8e66cf8969"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a1781a2f3a9667b3065d402d1f11986a2363e08"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9240fc1f2cde5331c61608da21b00394602ca762"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97711b964877242933484989224a3c4c5d88a5ee"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be00deee60044ffa820f9436415caeb665b2cda0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c25587fa26761e623198b4f47151fe79d09ccde6"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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