FKIE_CVE-2026-98299
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 - Updated: 2026-10-06 09:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: do not let tcp_rmem be set below 4096
We can hit a division by zero crash in tcp_rcvbuf_grow()
and tcp_rcv_space_adjust():
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
RIP: 0010:tcp_rcvbuf_grow+0x187/0x450 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:939
...
grow = div_u64(((u64)rcvwin << 1) * (newval - oldval), oldval);
The division uses oldval = tp->rcvq_space.space as divisor.
When tp->rcvq_space.space is zero, this leads to a divide-by-zero
exception.
tp->rcvq_space.space is initialized in tcp_init_buffer_space():
tp->rcvq_space.space = min3(tp->rcv_ssthresh, tp->rcv_wnd,
(u32)TCP_INIT_CWND * tp->advmss);
If tcp_rmem[1] is configured to very small values (such as 1),
sk->sk_rcvbuf is initialized to 1. Then tcp_full_space(sk), which
computes (sk->sk_rcvbuf * scaling_ratio) >> 8, truncates to 0.
This sets tp->window_clamp = 0, tp->rcv_ssthresh = 0, and
tp->rcvq_space.space = 0. Later, when data arrives and DRS is invoked,
tcp_rcvbuf_grow() divides by oldval == 0.
Back in 2015, commit b1cb59cf2efe ("net: sysctl_net_core: check SNDBUF
and RCVBUF for min length") ensured that net.core.rmem_default and
net.core.rmem_max cannot be set below SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF. Similarly,
SO_RCVBUF setsockopt enforces max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF).
However, net.ipv4.tcp_rmem still had .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, allowing
arbitrarily small values.
Because SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF depends on sizeof(struct sk_buff) and cacheline
alignment, its value varies across architectures and configuration options.
Using a fixed constant of 4096 ensures a predictable, architecture-
independent lower bound that is safely above SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF everywhere
and matches the documented 4K default.
Fix this by setting tcp_rmem.extra1 to 4096 and updating the documentation.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst",
"net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "879907631b9e70eedb62d76461b29afa106ebe7a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8e32532d0fa3191ecf9524b0e6bafa0832e712ba",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "67b83c15bed9eeeb8d1a6dbf88a5f79525970173",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9a4f49bf8d2da4e52e904f60c29cca317bab9b3a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "60df201dbb19a1bf6478b56d100f7ae1fe90e46a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7898bda1ebc198f5559b301a96dd5398edd4d4d3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1c4bb940c3bb4325bb88ac1b7eaf5faaa39e7d63",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "83a945a529d6e002dd7339c532288a931f463dba",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst",
"net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.12"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.12",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.271",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.222",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.189",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.54",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc4",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntcp: do not let tcp_rmem be set below 4096\n\nWe can hit a division by zero crash in tcp_rcvbuf_grow()\nand tcp_rcv_space_adjust():\n\ndivide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\nRIP: 0010:tcp_rcvbuf_grow+0x187/0x450 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:939\n...\ngrow = div_u64(((u64)rcvwin \u003c\u003c 1) * (newval - oldval), oldval);\n\nThe division uses oldval = tp-\u003ercvq_space.space as divisor.\nWhen tp-\u003ercvq_space.space is zero, this leads to a divide-by-zero\nexception.\n\ntp-\u003ercvq_space.space is initialized in tcp_init_buffer_space():\n tp-\u003ercvq_space.space = min3(tp-\u003ercv_ssthresh, tp-\u003ercv_wnd,\n (u32)TCP_INIT_CWND * tp-\u003eadvmss);\n\nIf tcp_rmem[1] is configured to very small values (such as 1),\nsk-\u003esk_rcvbuf is initialized to 1. Then tcp_full_space(sk), which\ncomputes (sk-\u003esk_rcvbuf * scaling_ratio) \u003e\u003e 8, truncates to 0.\nThis sets tp-\u003ewindow_clamp = 0, tp-\u003ercv_ssthresh = 0, and\ntp-\u003ercvq_space.space = 0. Later, when data arrives and DRS is invoked,\ntcp_rcvbuf_grow() divides by oldval == 0.\n\nBack in 2015, commit b1cb59cf2efe (\"net: sysctl_net_core: check SNDBUF\nand RCVBUF for min length\") ensured that net.core.rmem_default and\nnet.core.rmem_max cannot be set below SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF. Similarly,\nSO_RCVBUF setsockopt enforces max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF).\n\nHowever, net.ipv4.tcp_rmem still had .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, allowing\narbitrarily small values.\n\nBecause SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF depends on sizeof(struct sk_buff) and cacheline\nalignment, its value varies across architectures and configuration options.\nUsing a fixed constant of 4096 ensures a predictable, architecture-\nindependent lower bound that is safely above SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF everywhere\nand matches the documented 4K default.\n\nFix this by setting tcp_rmem.extra1 to 4096 and updating the documentation."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98299",
"lastModified": "2026-10-06T09:18:20.697",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:20.697",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c4bb940c3bb4325bb88ac1b7eaf5faaa39e7d63"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60df201dbb19a1bf6478b56d100f7ae1fe90e46a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67b83c15bed9eeeb8d1a6dbf88a5f79525970173"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7898bda1ebc198f5559b301a96dd5398edd4d4d3"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/83a945a529d6e002dd7339c532288a931f463dba"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/879907631b9e70eedb62d76461b29afa106ebe7a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e32532d0fa3191ecf9524b0e6bafa0832e712ba"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a4f49bf8d2da4e52e904f60c29cca317bab9b3a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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