FKIE_CVE-2026-98215
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 - Updated: 2026-10-06 09:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: preserve user SID across nested backing files
SELinux saves the user file SID in a backing-file security blob so it
remains available after mmap() replaces vma->vm_file with a backing file.
For nested backing files (overlayfs over overlayfs, or FUSE passthrough
backed by overlayfs), user_file may itself be a backing file. Its
fsec->sid is the SID of the mounter that opened it, rather than the user
that opened the top-level file. mprotect() then checks fd { use } against
the mounter SID. This can incorrectly deny access without a domain
transition, or check the wrong target SID after one.
Copy the saved user SID when user_file is a backing file. Keep using the
regular file SID for the first backing layer.
With two nested overlayfs mounts and SELinux enforcing,
mprotect(PROT_READ) returns EACCES with an fd { use } denial against the
mounter SID. With this change, mprotect() succeeds.
Tested on arm64 QEMU with a small BusyBox initramfs and a purpose-built
SELinux policy. The original test was also repeated with Fedora Cloud
Base 44 userspace and gave the same result.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"security/selinux/hooks.c",
"security/selinux/include/objsec.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "caa1b913d90d5dc07073733326d2af0f0288f089",
"status": "affected",
"version": "bc6c380c1159de52a252ed11f19a42c47f60a735",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6aaeec59aadcd1eafc18b049f1b759fb6b9d9569",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8bacd09f12c27710228562e4d13163e58c5f4a45",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9d99b770e7b67b00bdef9005b928aad13e1d679b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d844702198395d3f80222777030f69db6be6b709",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ff20d16b2e8230c034e21540043df47222dcc09b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "82544d36b1729153c8aeb179e84750f0c085d3b1",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8c0c602202b9a4909b00bc3354e3c0355bc69e65",
"status": "affected",
"version": "82544d36b1729153c8aeb179e84750f0c085d3b1",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "cd0e707a927a70cdfd8bc5a512a9719a87f5ed51",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.6.158",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6.144",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.12.112",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.12.95",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.18.54",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18.38",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0.4",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"security/selinux/hooks.c",
"security/selinux/include/objsec.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.54",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc4",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nselinux: preserve user SID across nested backing files\n\nSELinux saves the user file SID in a backing-file security blob so it\nremains available after mmap() replaces vma-\u003evm_file with a backing file.\n\nFor nested backing files (overlayfs over overlayfs, or FUSE passthrough\nbacked by overlayfs), user_file may itself be a backing file. Its\nfsec-\u003esid is the SID of the mounter that opened it, rather than the user\nthat opened the top-level file. mprotect() then checks fd { use } against\nthe mounter SID. This can incorrectly deny access without a domain\ntransition, or check the wrong target SID after one.\n\nCopy the saved user SID when user_file is a backing file. Keep using the\nregular file SID for the first backing layer.\n\nWith two nested overlayfs mounts and SELinux enforcing,\nmprotect(PROT_READ) returns EACCES with an fd { use } denial against the\nmounter SID. With this change, mprotect() succeeds.\n\nTested on arm64 QEMU with a small BusyBox initramfs and a purpose-built\nSELinux policy. The original test was also repeated with Fedora Cloud\nBase 44 userspace and gave the same result."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98215",
"lastModified": "2026-10-06T09:18:08.107",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:08.107",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6aaeec59aadcd1eafc18b049f1b759fb6b9d9569"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c0c602202b9a4909b00bc3354e3c0355bc69e65"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d99b770e7b67b00bdef9005b928aad13e1d679b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/caa1b913d90d5dc07073733326d2af0f0288f089"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff20d16b2e8230c034e21540043df47222dcc09b"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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