FKIE_CVE-2026-98104
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sched/cls_u32.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "f4ee13ed7f7b22dcd8287fcf477ae37bd84567da",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7801db8aec957fa6610efe0ee26a6c8bc0f1d73b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "84223baf21bc9b008444ae9bc38d5fb91fe00b9d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7801db8aec957fa6610efe0ee26a6c8bc0f1d73b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6890e28840bae4f6805e8de981c4ec8e12a4e064",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7801db8aec957fa6610efe0ee26a6c8bc0f1d73b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "feab9261b537df4ebb8350e4779bc185373059fd",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7801db8aec957fa6610efe0ee26a6c8bc0f1d73b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f594f04268d01c5fdc975f3f51fc219ea2159ac6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7801db8aec957fa6610efe0ee26a6c8bc0f1d73b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d7e7e98d23f42a92d9ab7e36302bd96bd9b33b5f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7801db8aec957fa6610efe0ee26a6c8bc0f1d73b",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sched/cls_u32.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.189",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.111",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: cls_u32: fix duplicate handle when node ID pool is exhausted\n\ngen_new_kid() falls back to returning max (htid | 0xFFF) when both\nidr_alloc_u32() ranges are full, instead of reporting an error.\nu32_change() trusts that value and inserts a new knode with a handle\nthat is already live in the hash table, breaking handle uniqueness\nwithin the table\u0027s node ID space.\n\nThe handle was never reserved in ht-\u003ehandle_idr, so every later error\npath that does idr_remove(\u0026ht-\u003ehandle_idr, handle) removes the\nreservation of a different, live knode, which is then reused \u2014 one\nfailed add compounds into further duplicates.\n\nThe 4095 limit is per (table, bucket) \u2014 ht-\u003ehandle_idr is per hash\ntable and the range is derived from htid (bucketid), so a table with\ndivisor 256 can legitimately hold 256*4095 knodes.\n\nThe sibling helper gen_new_htid() has the same silent in-band failure:\nit returns 0 when the tp_c handle pool (1..0x7FF) is full, and\nu32_init() publishes the root hash table with handle 0 without\nchecking. Two root tables with handle 0 alias in u32_lookup_ht(),\nallowing cross-tcf_proto knode add/lookup/delete. Add the same\nexhaustion check that the divisor path already has.\n\nReturn an error so u32_change() fails with ENOSPC/ENOMEM when the\nnode ID space is exhausted, and so u32_init() fails with -ENOMEM\nwhen the hash table ID space is exhausted. The extack message\ndistinguishes pool exhaustion (-ENOSPC) from a transient allocation\nfailure (-ENOMEM).\n\nConditions to recreate the bug:\n- CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_CLS_U32=y (or =m with module loaded)\n- Create a clsact qdisc on a device, then add 4095 u32 filters with\n auto-generated handles to fill the node ID space for the root hash\n table (single bucket). The 4096th auto-handle filter add triggers\n the duplicate handle (fh 800::fff reused). Reachable at Level 2\n (unshare -Urn, namespace-local CAP_NET_ADMIN).\n- For gen_new_htid: create 2047 u32 proto entries on the same block\n to fill the tp_c handle pool, then create one more. The root table\n gets handle 0 and aliases with other handle-0 root tables."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98104",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:18:07.770",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:40.793",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6890e28840bae4f6805e8de981c4ec8e12a4e064"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84223baf21bc9b008444ae9bc38d5fb91fe00b9d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7e7e98d23f42a92d9ab7e36302bd96bd9b33b5f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f4ee13ed7f7b22dcd8287fcf477ae37bd84567da"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f594f04268d01c5fdc975f3f51fc219ea2159ac6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/feab9261b537df4ebb8350e4779bc185373059fd"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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