FKIE_CVE-2026-98071

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: clear cp_flags bits individually in rds_conn_path_reset() rds_conn_path_reset() wipes the whole flag word with a plain cp->cp_flags = 0 store. Every other accessor of that word uses atomic bitops, and some of them can run concurrently with the reset: RDS_LL_SEND_FULL is set from rds_send_xmit() and cleared from the transport completion paths, neither of which holds anything that excludes the shutdown worker. A plain store racing an atomic read-modify-write on the same word is a data race, and whichever side loses has its update silently discarded. Clear the two bits the reset is actually responsible for instead. RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL need no store at all here: they belong to the caller, rds_conn_shutdown(), which waits for both to be clear before calling the transport shutdown and this reset. This also gives every bit in cp_flags a single well-defined writer discipline, which the following patches rely on when they turn RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL into bit locks held across the teardown: a blanket store mid-teardown would destroy lock ownership that an atomic clear preserves. Oracle UEK carries the same conversion ("net/rds: Preserve essential connection state flags"), motivated by its asynchronous shutdown state machine, whose progress and destroy flags must survive the reset. UEK's variant also clears RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL because there the reset runs as the final step of a teardown that owns both bits, making those clears its unlock. Upstream that release belongs in rds_conn_shutdown(): once a later patch in this series turns the two bits into locks held across the teardown, ending ownership needs release semantics and a wake-up that a plain clear inside the reset would not provide. Based on Oracle UEK commit "net/rds: Preserve essential connection state flags" by Gerd Rausch.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/103c4b13c4f50322910078d1c02f29334a574122
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b8d7563c28b8112e6e54abe413b028ef3f8c549
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b767b48614c38687d717082860de7aa46f3b142c
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7dc5da660eb5ffa7f7b4d33f2c74cb71c6edd6c
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8a8b6d25e7426a638c60eaba2129c0664131e84
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9a7c1eb0ad41dcf004a9e870e452cafedcd9172
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb62aa8f04655a4df487913949719c0a1266ed73
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed3ee0ac4aafda50c2f4381eb973beefeb7879ac
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/rds/connection.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "c9a7c1eb0ad41dcf004a9e870e452cafedcd9172",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "00e0f34c616603ba6500f41943cbf89eb4a8a5be",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b767b48614c38687d717082860de7aa46f3b142c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "00e0f34c616603ba6500f41943cbf89eb4a8a5be",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b7dc5da660eb5ffa7f7b4d33f2c74cb71c6edd6c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "00e0f34c616603ba6500f41943cbf89eb4a8a5be",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b8a8b6d25e7426a638c60eaba2129c0664131e84",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "00e0f34c616603ba6500f41943cbf89eb4a8a5be",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ed3ee0ac4aafda50c2f4381eb973beefeb7879ac",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "00e0f34c616603ba6500f41943cbf89eb4a8a5be",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6b8d7563c28b8112e6e54abe413b028ef3f8c549",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "00e0f34c616603ba6500f41943cbf89eb4a8a5be",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "cb62aa8f04655a4df487913949719c0a1266ed73",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "00e0f34c616603ba6500f41943cbf89eb4a8a5be",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "103c4b13c4f50322910078d1c02f29334a574122",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "00e0f34c616603ba6500f41943cbf89eb4a8a5be",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/rds/connection.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.6.30"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.6.30",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.10.271",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.15.222",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.189",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.158",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.111",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.53",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.7",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: clear cp_flags bits individually in rds_conn_path_reset()\n\nrds_conn_path_reset() wipes the whole flag word with a plain\ncp-\u003ecp_flags = 0 store.  Every other accessor of that word uses\natomic bitops, and some of them can run concurrently with the reset:\nRDS_LL_SEND_FULL is set from rds_send_xmit() and cleared from the\ntransport completion paths, neither of which holds anything that\nexcludes the shutdown worker.  A plain store racing an atomic\nread-modify-write on the same word is a data race, and whichever\nside loses has its update silently discarded.\n\nClear the two bits the reset is actually responsible for instead.\nRDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL need no store at all here: they\nbelong to the caller, rds_conn_shutdown(), which waits for both to be\nclear before calling the transport shutdown and this reset.\n\nThis also gives every bit in cp_flags a single well-defined writer\ndiscipline, which the following patches rely on when they turn\nRDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL into bit locks held across the\nteardown: a blanket store mid-teardown would destroy lock ownership\nthat an atomic clear preserves.\n\nOracle UEK carries the same conversion (\"net/rds: Preserve essential\nconnection state flags\"), motivated by its asynchronous shutdown\nstate machine, whose progress and destroy flags must survive the\nreset.  UEK\u0027s variant also clears RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL\nbecause there the reset runs as the final step of a teardown that\nowns both bits, making those clears its unlock.  Upstream that\nrelease belongs in rds_conn_shutdown(): once a later patch in this\nseries turns the two bits into locks held across the teardown, ending\nownership needs release semantics and a wake-up that a plain clear\ninside the reset would not provide.\n\nBased on Oracle UEK commit \"net/rds: Preserve essential connection\nstate flags\" by Gerd Rausch."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-98071",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:18:02.350",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-09-25T11:17:36.327",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/103c4b13c4f50322910078d1c02f29334a574122"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b8d7563c28b8112e6e54abe413b028ef3f8c549"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b767b48614c38687d717082860de7aa46f3b142c"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7dc5da660eb5ffa7f7b4d33f2c74cb71c6edd6c"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8a8b6d25e7426a638c60eaba2129c0664131e84"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9a7c1eb0ad41dcf004a9e870e452cafedcd9172"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb62aa8f04655a4df487913949719c0a1266ed73"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed3ee0ac4aafda50c2f4381eb973beefeb7879ac"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}



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