FKIE_CVE-2026-98067
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-21 13:21| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/erofs/decompressor.c",
"fs/erofs/internal.h",
"fs/erofs/zdata.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "dcc5e6c9e4d06fe73fc61e730ee3e51dd115a4d8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8e6c8fa9f2e95c88a642521a5da19a8e31748846",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d923e53472b468a50a6cf41341531d5170c68371",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8e6c8fa9f2e95c88a642521a5da19a8e31748846",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ec52dfed7b14514ed97ee71161e4cf4cfe2fbff2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8e6c8fa9f2e95c88a642521a5da19a8e31748846",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c9a2db4b9950b59c571258e4bae74c271f62dd66",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8e6c8fa9f2e95c88a642521a5da19a8e31748846",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "82e664cf1219c459c33aae931b222cf951af9cb7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8e6c8fa9f2e95c88a642521a5da19a8e31748846",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/erofs/decompressor.c",
"fs/erofs/internal.h",
"fs/erofs/zdata.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.13"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.13",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.160",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.114",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nerofs: disable LZ4 rolling decompression for now\n\nLZ4 rolling decompression [1] was introduced to reduce the memory\nfootprint of temporary pages:\n\n For many cases, it is needed for users to read small data within\n a compressed extent (pcluster), either due to random small read, or\n since uptodate folios (typically order-0) cannot be reused for\n decompression again since decompression algorithm refills\n already-uptodate folios.\n\nRolling decompression works because LZ4 is LZ77-based and only refers\nto the most recent 64 KiB of decompressed data, so in theory only a\nbounded rolling window of temporary pages is needed when decompressing.\n\nIt can save a lot of temporary memory, e.g.\n 601,960-byte data can be compressed into a 256k LZ4 compressed extent,\n which means it needs 146 extra pages per request in the worst case if\n rolling decompression is disabled.\n\nHowever, the upstream LZ4 implementation is not under EROFS\u0027 control:\nFor example, the literal copy memmove() may still **copy long literals\nbackward** on x86 based on the address comparison even when the source\nand destination ranges do not overlap (IOWs, inline decompression\ndoesn\u0027t need to be considered here). That breaks the rolling assumption\nand makes the optimization broken.\n\nDisable it for now to make sure the data correctness first since EROFS\nis used everywhere now: The rolling window approach can be revived once\nwe either ensure that the official LZ4 code always copies forward for\nnon-overlapping ranges or maintain our own LZ4 implementation in EROFS.\n\nThe main impact is a higher runtime memory footprint; However, recent\ncommit 0f6273ab4637 (\"erofs: add a reserved buffer pool for lz4\ndecompression\") helps mitigate this when enabled but it\u0027s still not\nperfect.\n\n[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc19/presentation/gao\n \u00a7 3.3 Decompression"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98067",
"lastModified": "2026-10-21T13:21:21.163",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:35.787",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/82e664cf1219c459c33aae931b222cf951af9cb7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9a2db4b9950b59c571258e4bae74c271f62dd66"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d923e53472b468a50a6cf41341531d5170c68371"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dcc5e6c9e4d06fe73fc61e730ee3e51dd115a4d8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec52dfed7b14514ed97ee71161e4cf4cfe2fbff2"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.