FKIE_CVE-2026-98007

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject non-scalar bpf_loop iteration counts bpf_loop() declares its nr_loops argument as ARG_ANYTHING. Privileged programs may pass pointer values to such arguments, so check_func_arg() lets a pointer-valued R1 reach the helper-specific checks. Since commit bb124da69c47 ("bpf: keep track of max number of bpf_loop callback iterations"), the verifier marks R1 precise and reads its upper bound to limit callback simulation. Precision backtracking only accepts scalar registers, so passing a pointer instead triggers the "backtracking misuse" verifier warning. Kernels with panic_on_warn enabled subsequently panic. Introduce ARG_SCALAR for helper arguments that only accept scalar values and use it for bpf_loop() nr_loops. Generic helper argument validation then rejects pointers before loop inlining and precision processing.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/linux/bpf.h",
            "kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c",
            "kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2ff38b3552af53238aee6c877ae64cc798d46fce",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "bfc5c19b4b48840627af0d0f1c8f4461b276e508",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "656d40d1ca228ee21a9b3280432479fc9eae75ab",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "bb124da69c47dd98d69361ec13244ece50bec63e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "e2e1161e03fecff6d2229a81b024337144bfcd97",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "bb124da69c47dd98d69361ec13244ece50bec63e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f8ae8275c721334ee50fafdd986fb83294eb941a",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "bb124da69c47dd98d69361ec13244ece50bec63e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c3fd8e5fd100f122bad503bdc0e9277219533253",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "bb124da69c47dd98d69361ec13244ece50bec63e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.6.158",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.6.15",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/linux/bpf.h",
            "kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c",
            "kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.7"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.7",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.158",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.111",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.53",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.7",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reject non-scalar bpf_loop iteration counts\n\nbpf_loop() declares its nr_loops argument as ARG_ANYTHING. Privileged\nprograms may pass pointer values to such arguments, so check_func_arg()\nlets a pointer-valued R1 reach the helper-specific checks.\n\nSince commit bb124da69c47 (\"bpf: keep track of max number of bpf_loop\ncallback iterations\"), the verifier marks R1 precise and reads its upper\nbound to limit callback simulation. Precision backtracking only accepts\nscalar registers, so passing a pointer instead triggers the \"backtracking\nmisuse\" verifier warning. Kernels with panic_on_warn enabled subsequently\npanic.\n\nIntroduce ARG_SCALAR for helper arguments that only accept scalar values\nand use it for bpf_loop() nr_loops. Generic helper argument validation then\nrejects pointers before loop inlining and precision processing."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-98007",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:17:52.070",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-09-25T11:17:28.967",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ff38b3552af53238aee6c877ae64cc798d46fce"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/656d40d1ca228ee21a9b3280432479fc9eae75ab"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c3fd8e5fd100f122bad503bdc0e9277219533253"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2e1161e03fecff6d2229a81b024337144bfcd97"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8ae8275c721334ee50fafdd986fb83294eb941a"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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