FKIE_CVE-2026-97974
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ipv6/route.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "e7ff91f19c1aae039a4257fa86fe849afe185291",
"status": "affected",
"version": "bd11ff421d36abdb585b9104fa70057bf01b3110",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1155234c2227cf36072a43e1e09119472ade7ca7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "bd11ff421d36abdb585b9104fa70057bf01b3110",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "cdca92eddc025fdb90071be97738f7d55a65f8dd",
"status": "affected",
"version": "bd11ff421d36abdb585b9104fa70057bf01b3110",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ipv6/route.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: null-check fib6_node before accessing in __ip6_del_rt_siblings()\n\nsyzbot reported a null-ptr-deref in __ip6_del_rt_siblings() [0].\n\nThe stack trace hinted towards a null dereference of rt-\u003efib6_node when\nfn-\u003eleaf is accessed in __ip6_del_rt_siblings(). With\nRTNL_FLAG_DOIT_UNLOCKED set, inet6_rtm_delroute() operations run\nconcurrently without acquiring the RTNL lock. In ip6_route_del(), the\nroute lookup happens under rcu_read_lock() without acquiring\ntable-\u003etb6_lock.\n\nBetween ip6_route_del() looking up the route and __ip6_del_rt_siblings()\nacquiring table-\u003etb6_lock, another thread can modify the routing table.\nFor example, when an ECMP route is replaced via RTM_NEWROUTE with\nNLM_F_REPLACE, fib6_add_rt2node() unlinks all old siblings and sets\niter-\u003efib6_node = NULL. A reproducer was found that triggers this [1].\n\nAdd a check to ensure rt-\u003efib6_node is non-null before accessing it.\n\n[0]\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000020-0x0000000000000027]\nRIP: 0010:__ip6_del_rt_siblings+0x31e/0x7c0 net/ipv6/route.c:4056\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ip6_route_del+0x1054/0x1110 net/ipv6/route.c:4232\n inet6_rtm_delroute+0x5d7/0x6d0 net/ipv6/route.c:5669\n rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x802/0xc00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:7132\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x226/0x4a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556\n netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]\n netlink_unicast+0x7f5/0x990 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345\n netlink_sendmsg+0x813/0xb40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900\n sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x13a/0x180 net/socket.c:800\n __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:815 [inline]\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x565/0x870 net/socket.c:2713\n ___sys_sendmsg+0x2a5/0x360 net/socket.c:2767\n __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2799 [inline]\n __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2804 [inline]\n __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2802 [inline]\n __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1b7/0x290 net/socket.c:2802\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n[1] https://gist.github.com/NamanGulati/0766a1159b6ca61928faaf87425ff899"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-97974",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:17:48.773",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:25.310",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1155234c2227cf36072a43e1e09119472ade7ca7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cdca92eddc025fdb90071be97738f7d55a65f8dd"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7ff91f19c1aae039a4257fa86fe849afe185291"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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