FKIE_CVE-2026-97938

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-21 13:21
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: reboot: fix cad_pid use-after-free race cad_pid is a single kernel-wide struct pid pointer. proc_do_cad_pid() reads it and passes it to pid_vnr() without protecting the lifetime of the referenced struct pid. A concurrent writer can replace cad_pid and drop the final reference to the old struct pid after the reader has loaded the pointer but before pid_vnr() has finished dereferencing it, causing a use-after-free. kill_cad_pid() has the same lifetime race when it passes cad_pid to kill_pid(). At the time this issue was reported, an unprivileged user could reach the sysctl through user and PID namespaces because cad_pid was registered in pid_table[]. Moving cad_pid back to the global reboot sysctl table corrected that namespace and permission mismatch, but did not fix the underlying lifetime race. Fix this by treating cad_pid as an RCU-protected pointer at both read sites and by waiting for a grace period before dropping the old reference on the write side. call_rcu(&old_pid->rcu, ...) cannot be used here because free_pid() also queues pid->rcu; queueing the same rcu_head twice can corrupt the RCU callback list. Original KASAN crash stack: kernel/pid.c:545 pid_nr_ns() # reads freed pid->level kernel/pid.c:556 pid_vnr() # calls pid_nr_ns() kernel/pid.c:775 proc_do_cad_pid() # calls pid_vnr(cad_pid)
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c1a966bc047af2801a70b8eb13f9df5d7ab925f
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a88f78df753993469dab4d1831f8fb4256a9468
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a17b0e053197a6a42cdc75e75a35b17aa662088
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad72e2566643fff7f01666d845fb026898155e1f
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae3e53fe3c1241855e3a88f74877738349948c78
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/linux/sched.h",
            "include/linux/sched/signal.h",
            "init/main.c",
            "kernel/reboot.c",
            "kernel/signal.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0c1a966bc047af2801a70b8eb13f9df5d7ab925f",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9ec52099e4b8678a60e9f93e41ad87885d64f3e6",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ae3e53fe3c1241855e3a88f74877738349948c78",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9ec52099e4b8678a60e9f93e41ad87885d64f3e6",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ad72e2566643fff7f01666d845fb026898155e1f",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9ec52099e4b8678a60e9f93e41ad87885d64f3e6",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "9a17b0e053197a6a42cdc75e75a35b17aa662088",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9ec52099e4b8678a60e9f93e41ad87885d64f3e6",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5a88f78df753993469dab4d1831f8fb4256a9468",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9ec52099e4b8678a60e9f93e41ad87885d64f3e6",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/linux/sched.h",
            "include/linux/sched/signal.h",
            "init/main.c",
            "kernel/reboot.c",
            "kernel/signal.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.6.19"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.6.19",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.160",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.112",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.53",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.7",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nreboot: fix cad_pid use-after-free race\n\ncad_pid is a single kernel-wide struct pid pointer. proc_do_cad_pid()\nreads it and passes it to pid_vnr() without protecting the lifetime of\nthe referenced struct pid. A concurrent writer can replace cad_pid and\ndrop the final reference to the old struct pid after the reader has\nloaded the pointer but before pid_vnr() has finished dereferencing it,\ncausing a use-after-free.\n\nkill_cad_pid() has the same lifetime race when it passes cad_pid to\nkill_pid().\n\nAt the time this issue was reported, an unprivileged user could reach the\nsysctl through user and PID namespaces because cad_pid was registered in\npid_table[]. Moving cad_pid back to the global reboot sysctl table\ncorrected that namespace and permission mismatch, but did not fix the\nunderlying lifetime race.\n\nFix this by treating cad_pid as an RCU-protected pointer at both read\nsites and by waiting for a grace period before dropping the old reference\non the write side.\n\ncall_rcu(\u0026old_pid-\u003ercu, ...) cannot be used here because free_pid()\nalso queues pid-\u003ercu; queueing the same rcu_head twice can corrupt the\nRCU callback list.\n\nOriginal KASAN crash stack:\n  kernel/pid.c:545 pid_nr_ns()        # reads freed pid-\u003elevel\n  kernel/pid.c:556 pid_vnr()          # calls pid_nr_ns()\n  kernel/pid.c:775 proc_do_cad_pid()  # calls pid_vnr(cad_pid)"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-97938",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-21T13:21:16.970",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-09-25T11:17:21.193",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c1a966bc047af2801a70b8eb13f9df5d7ab925f"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a88f78df753993469dab4d1831f8fb4256a9468"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a17b0e053197a6a42cdc75e75a35b17aa662088"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad72e2566643fff7f01666d845fb026898155e1f"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae3e53fe3c1241855e3a88f74877738349948c78"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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