FKIE_CVE-2026-97902
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/super.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "111339816138f042a59778322f941edc26903484",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7366f8b6fc6aa21c4199cb5d337b023df69745b0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "76e478499913dc1f368aebe85b28b7d1265985ff",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7366f8b6fc6aa21c4199cb5d337b023df69745b0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ff2a694f6613d54ebd77ba72583d4d94446f55bd",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7366f8b6fc6aa21c4199cb5d337b023df69745b0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "fe967191e5851ea79818c5fe4e781c3882139218",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7366f8b6fc6aa21c4199cb5d337b023df69745b0",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/super.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.8"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.8",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.111",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs: don\u0027t return -EINVAL for successful nested thaw\n\nCommit 7366f8b6fc6a (\"fs: handle freezing from multiple devices\")\nreplaced the freeze_holders bitmask with per-holder counters to allow\nnested freezes. In the bitmask version, a thaw that released a shared\nhold while another holder remained returned 0. Since the rework,\nthaw_super_locked() drops the freeze reference via freeze_dec() but\nthen returns -EINVAL when other freezers remain, misinforming the\ncaller: the thaw did succeed, the superblock just stays frozen for the\nremaining holders.\n\nThis breaks bdev-initiated freezing. When a filesystem is frozen with\nFIFREEZE and additionally frozen via bdev_freeze() -- which nests by\ndesign, see fs_bdev_freeze() -- the subsequent bdev_thaw() receives\n-EINVAL from the holder op although its freeze reference was dropped,\nand therefore keeps bd_fsfreeze_count elevated. Then device-mapper\u0027s\nunlock_fs() ignores bdev_thaw()\u0027s return value, so nothing rebalances\nthe count. After the user\u0027s FITHAW and umount, the block device can\nnever be mounted again:\n\n dm-1: Can\u0027t mount, blockdev is frozen\n\nThere is no way for userspace to drop the leaked count; only\ndestroying the block device (or a reboot) recovers the device.\n\nReproducer (any kernel since v6.8):\n\n dmsetup create dut --table \"0 $(blockdev --getsz \"$DEV\") linear $DEV 0\"\n mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/dut\n mount /dev/mapper/dut /mnt\n fsfreeze --freeze /mnt # freeze_ucount == 1\n dmsetup suspend dut # bd_fsfreeze_count == 1, ucount == 2\n dmsetup resume dut # ucount 2 -\u003e 1, but thaw_super()\n # returns -EINVAL, so bdev_thaw()\n # keeps bd_fsfreeze_count at 1\n fsfreeze --unfreeze /mnt # filesystem thaws fine\n umount /mnt\n mount /dev/mapper/dut /mnt # EBUSY, forever\n\nThe same happens with fsfreeze held across an LVM snapshot of the\norigin volume.\n\nfs_bdev_thaw()\u0027s documentation already describes the intended\nsemantics: \"If this function returns zero it doesn\u0027t mean that the\nfilesystem is unfrozen as it may have been frozen multiple times\".\nRestore them by returning 0 when a nested thaw drops its hold while\nother freezers remain. Thawing without holding a freeze still fails\nwith -EINVAL as may_unfreeze() rejects that case before the reference\ncount is touched."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-97902",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:17:40.403",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:17.000",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/111339816138f042a59778322f941edc26903484"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76e478499913dc1f368aebe85b28b7d1265985ff"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe967191e5851ea79818c5fe4e781c3882139218"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff2a694f6613d54ebd77ba72583d4d94446f55bd"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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