FKIE_CVE-2026-93287

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-24 17:17 - Updated: 2026-10-03 11:17
Severity
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: smbus: reject oversized block transfers in the common path The SMBus block transfer length data->block[0] is validated in i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated() but that check runs too late for tracepoints and is skipped entirely when the adapter provides a native smbus_xfer implementation. This allows user-controlled oversized block lengths to reach tracepoint memcpy calls and driver callbacks unchecked. Add an early validation in __i2c_smbus_xfer() that rejects block transfers whose caller-supplied length is zero or exceeds I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX before any tracepoint fires or driver callback runs. data->block[0] is filled in by the device on SMBus block reads, so the check is scoped to operations where the length is actually supplied by the caller. This is consistent with the existing -EINVAL convention in the emulated path and protects all downstream consumers at once: the smbus_write tracepoint, all native smbus_xfer driver implementations, and the emulated path. Two distinct bugs are fixed by this change: Bug 1: smbus_write tracepoint OOB (include/trace/events/smbus.h) trace_smbus_write() fires before any validation and copies data->block[0]+1 bytes into a 34-byte event buffer. With block[0]=0xfe the tracepoint copies 255 bytes, overflowing by 221. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in trace_event_raw_event_smbus_write+0x27c/0x530 Read of size 255 at addr ffff88800d98fcf8 by task poc_smbus/91 Call Trace: <TASK> __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x80 trace_event_raw_event_smbus_write+0x27c/0x530 __i2c_smbus_xfer+0x43a/0xa40 i2c_smbus_xfer+0x19e/0x340 i2cdev_ioctl_smbus+0x38f/0x7f0 i2cdev_ioctl+0x35e/0x680 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x147/0x1e0 do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x15a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e </TASK> Bug 2: i2c-stub I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA OOB (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c) stub_xfer() implements .smbus_xfer directly and only clamps block[0] against 256-command, not I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX. With block[0]=0xff and command=0 the loop accesses block[1+i] for i up to 254, far past the 34-byte union. UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223:44 index 34 is out of range for type '__u8 [34]' Call Trace: <TASK> __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xd7/0x120 stub_xfer+0x1971/0x198f [i2c_stub] __i2c_smbus_xfer+0x306/0xa40 i2c_smbus_xfer+0x19e/0x340 i2cdev_ioctl_smbus+0x38f/0x7f0 i2cdev_ioctl+0x35e/0x680 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x147/0x1e0 do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x15a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e </TASK> Both traces reproduced on v7.0-rc6+i2c/for-current with KASAN+UBSAN.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3051cd060fa496df42954291fa2306ed2eab4ecc
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/356875e33f2c6d2061a02c9dec1a1e639d265a55
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72ca5e0b8b7a62615758f8871c34d61616c2dc8b
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/856dffcc097b3d8ed45a643ebda07cb92968cb33
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4b478bc50b7ca9865e237909941253a0f7111a2
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df077253f6405d67ad087538e495ef32a05717b7
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f09edffba97d37b1fdff5f818a9a45f8a98ac171
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "856dffcc097b3d8ed45a643ebda07cb92968cb33",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4710317891e4824ce1510a6b5066abbd3e917750",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "356875e33f2c6d2061a02c9dec1a1e639d265a55",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4710317891e4824ce1510a6b5066abbd3e917750",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "72ca5e0b8b7a62615758f8871c34d61616c2dc8b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4710317891e4824ce1510a6b5066abbd3e917750",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "df077253f6405d67ad087538e495ef32a05717b7",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4710317891e4824ce1510a6b5066abbd3e917750",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f09edffba97d37b1fdff5f818a9a45f8a98ac171",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4710317891e4824ce1510a6b5066abbd3e917750",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c4b478bc50b7ca9865e237909941253a0f7111a2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4710317891e4824ce1510a6b5066abbd3e917750",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3051cd060fa496df42954291fa2306ed2eab4ecc",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4710317891e4824ce1510a6b5066abbd3e917750",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.6.33"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.6.33",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.10.271",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.15.222",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.189",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.158",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.111",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.53",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ni2c: smbus: reject oversized block transfers in the common path\n\nThe SMBus block transfer length data-\u003eblock[0] is validated in\ni2c_smbus_xfer_emulated() but that check runs too late for tracepoints\nand is skipped entirely when the adapter provides a native smbus_xfer\nimplementation. This allows user-controlled oversized block lengths to\nreach tracepoint memcpy calls and driver callbacks unchecked.\n\nAdd an early validation in __i2c_smbus_xfer() that rejects block\ntransfers whose caller-supplied length is zero or exceeds\nI2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX before any tracepoint fires or driver callback\nruns. data-\u003eblock[0] is filled in by the device on SMBus block reads,\nso the check is scoped to operations where the length is actually\nsupplied by the caller. This is consistent with the existing -EINVAL\nconvention in the emulated path and protects all downstream consumers\nat once: the smbus_write tracepoint, all native smbus_xfer driver\nimplementations, and the emulated path.\n\nTwo distinct bugs are fixed by this change:\n\nBug 1: smbus_write tracepoint OOB (include/trace/events/smbus.h)\n  trace_smbus_write() fires before any validation and copies\n  data-\u003eblock[0]+1 bytes into a 34-byte event buffer. With\n  block[0]=0xfe the tracepoint copies 255 bytes, overflowing by 221.\n\n BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in trace_event_raw_event_smbus_write+0x27c/0x530\n Read of size 255 at addr ffff88800d98fcf8 by task poc_smbus/91\n Call Trace:\n  \u003cTASK\u003e\n  __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x80\n  trace_event_raw_event_smbus_write+0x27c/0x530\n  __i2c_smbus_xfer+0x43a/0xa40\n  i2c_smbus_xfer+0x19e/0x340\n  i2cdev_ioctl_smbus+0x38f/0x7f0\n  i2cdev_ioctl+0x35e/0x680\n  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x147/0x1e0\n  do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x15a0\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n  \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nBug 2: i2c-stub I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA OOB (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c)\n  stub_xfer() implements .smbus_xfer directly and only clamps\n  block[0] against 256-command, not I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX. With\n  block[0]=0xff and command=0 the loop accesses block[1+i] for\n  i up to 254, far past the 34-byte union.\n\n UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223:44\n index 34 is out of range for type \u0027__u8 [34]\u0027\n Call Trace:\n  \u003cTASK\u003e\n  __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xd7/0x120\n  stub_xfer+0x1971/0x198f [i2c_stub]\n  __i2c_smbus_xfer+0x306/0xa40\n  i2c_smbus_xfer+0x19e/0x340\n  i2cdev_ioctl_smbus+0x38f/0x7f0\n  i2cdev_ioctl+0x35e/0x680\n  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x147/0x1e0\n  do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x15a0\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n  \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nBoth traces reproduced on v7.0-rc6+i2c/for-current with KASAN+UBSAN."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-93287",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-03T11:17:47.247",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-24T17:17:09.930",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3051cd060fa496df42954291fa2306ed2eab4ecc"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/356875e33f2c6d2061a02c9dec1a1e639d265a55"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72ca5e0b8b7a62615758f8871c34d61616c2dc8b"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/856dffcc097b3d8ed45a643ebda07cb92968cb33"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4b478bc50b7ca9865e237909941253a0f7111a2"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df077253f6405d67ad087538e495ef32a05717b7"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f09edffba97d37b1fdff5f818a9a45f8a98ac171"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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