FKIE_CVE-2026-93253

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-24 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/isolation: Defer freeing of cpumask memblock memory to initcall When testing a linux-next kernel with commit 59bd1d914bb5 ("memblock: warn when freeing reserved memory before memory map is initialized"), the following warning was hit when there was a "nohz_full" kernel boot parameter. Cannot free reserved memory because of deferred initialization of the memory map WARNING: mm/memblock.c:904 at __free_reserved_area+0xde/0xf0, CPU#0: swapper/0/0 : Call Trace: <TASK> memblock_phys_free+0xcb/0x100 housekeeping_init+0x14c/0x170 start_kernel+0x207/0x450 x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xda/0xe0 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 </TASK> IOW, we shouldn't free memblock allocated memory so early in the boot process when memory map isn't fully initialized in deferred_init_memmap(). Fix it by saving the housekeeping cpumask memblock memory to be freed into a llist free list in housekeeping_init() and add a new housekeeping_late_init() helper to defer the actual freeing of memblock memory to when initcall's are being processed. The cpumask memblock memory is treated as a llist_node with the size of a "long" type which is also smallest cpumask size that can be allocated. The non-atomic version of the llist APIs are used as there is no contention. This commit depends on the presence of commit 7c2eee9c1367 ("memblock: don't touch memblock arrays when memblock_free() is called late") to prevent a KASAN UAF bug report [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20260505051821.1107133-1-longman@redhat.com/
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b58c749b8c5244e259a0230bc57b10b010dc545
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/811fdac2d1bdf0b0d3fda262aac288ddd13a1422
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "kernel/sched/isolation.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "811fdac2d1bdf0b0d3fda262aac288ddd13a1422",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "27c3a5967f054ab666704cb28f2aeb18ca07cab7",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2b58c749b8c5244e259a0230bc57b10b010dc545",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "27c3a5967f054ab666704cb28f2aeb18ca07cab7",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "kernel/sched/isolation.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.0"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.0",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched/isolation: Defer freeing of cpumask memblock memory to initcall\n\nWhen testing a linux-next kernel with commit 59bd1d914bb5 (\"memblock:\nwarn when freeing reserved memory before memory map is initialized\"),\nthe following warning was hit when there was a \"nohz_full\" kernel boot\nparameter.\n\n  Cannot free reserved memory because of deferred initialization of the memory map\n  WARNING: mm/memblock.c:904 at __free_reserved_area+0xde/0xf0, CPU#0: swapper/0/0\n    :\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   memblock_phys_free+0xcb/0x100\n   housekeeping_init+0x14c/0x170\n   start_kernel+0x207/0x450\n   x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30\n   x86_64_start_kernel+0xda/0xe0\n   common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141\n   \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nIOW, we shouldn\u0027t free memblock allocated memory so early\nin the boot process when memory map isn\u0027t fully initialized in\ndeferred_init_memmap().\n\nFix it by saving the housekeeping cpumask memblock memory to be\nfreed into a llist free list in housekeeping_init() and add a new\nhousekeeping_late_init() helper to defer the actual freeing of memblock\nmemory to when initcall\u0027s are being processed. The cpumask memblock\nmemory is treated as a llist_node with the size of a \"long\" type which\nis also smallest cpumask size that can be allocated.\n\nThe non-atomic version of the llist APIs are used as there is no\ncontention.\n\nThis commit depends on the presence of commit 7c2eee9c1367 (\"memblock:\ndon\u0027t touch memblock arrays when memblock_free() is called late\")\nto prevent a KASAN UAF bug report [1].\n\n [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20260505051821.1107133-1-longman@redhat.com/"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-93253",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:17:16.593",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-09-24T16:17:21.640",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b58c749b8c5244e259a0230bc57b10b010dc545"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/811fdac2d1bdf0b0d3fda262aac288ddd13a1422"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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