FKIE_CVE-2026-93231
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-24 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:21| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/lockd/lockd.h",
"fs/lockd/svcsubs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "e7124d223c5a2dfb4c1a7b2eea24375edc355a10",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4373ea84c84d8a96e99d3da99e813d3e36d1bd11",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "68282cbc197b280711f66c4cf05165f911785bcc",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4373ea84c84d8a96e99d3da99e813d3e36d1bd11",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "cfbf21d21aea1a83d5ff38d50466a655e0a6a31d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4373ea84c84d8a96e99d3da99e813d3e36d1bd11",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4fe2db296c9cd897dd1fe06cc0ae9cbc13beefc5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4373ea84c84d8a96e99d3da99e813d3e36d1bd11",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d34c2ac447fe0490ede828e0143e2cbcb59e6c77",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4373ea84c84d8a96e99d3da99e813d3e36d1bd11",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0d72e78c9d38d5377a059a4837f82b65b91cdcf6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4373ea84c84d8a96e99d3da99e813d3e36d1bd11",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "21bcb609e0ab1dd60f39ca3498f85808933bcc9f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4373ea84c84d8a96e99d3da99e813d3e36d1bd11",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b9060689f49dc663e9a3d069c4a65ff63a836e66",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4373ea84c84d8a96e99d3da99e813d3e36d1bd11",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/lockd/lockd.h",
"fs/lockd/svcsubs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.26"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.26",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.273",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.224",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.191",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.160",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.51",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlockd: fix swapped arguments in nlmsvc_match_ip()\n\nWhen releasing locks by server IP address via /proc/fs/nfsd/unlock_ip,\nnlmsvc_unlock_all_by_ip() calls nlm_traverse_files() with the server\nsockaddr as the opaque @data argument:\n\n\tnlm_traverse_files(server_addr, nlmsvc_match_ip, NULL);\n\nThe match callback is later invoked from nlm_traverse_locks() as:\n\n\tmatch(lockhost, host);\n\nwhere the first argument is the nlm_host that owns the lock, and the\nsecond argument is the @data that was originally passed down (here the\nserver sockaddr). This is the convention every other match callback\nrelies on (nlmsvc_mark_host(), nlmsvc_same_host(), nlmsvc_is_client()):\narg1 is the real nlm_host, arg2 is the caller-supplied reference value.\n\nnlmsvc_match_ip() has had these two arguments reversed ever since the\nunlock-by-IP feature was introduced in commit 4373ea84c84d (\"lockd:\nunlock lockd locks associated with a given server ip\"):\n\n\treturn rpc_cmp_addr(nlm_srcaddr(host), datap);\n\nHere @host is actually the server sockaddr, so nlm_srcaddr(host)\ndereferences a struct sockaddr as a struct nlm_host and reads garbage\nat the offset of h_srcaddr; meanwhile @datap is actually the lock\nowner\u0027s nlm_host but is compared as a sockaddr. As a result the\ncomparison practically never matches and locks are not released for the\nrequested IP.\n\nSwap the arguments so the lock owner\u0027s source address is compared\nagainst the requested server address:\n\n\treturn rpc_cmp_addr(nlm_srcaddr(datap), (struct sockaddr *)host);\n\n[ cel: fix the misleading typedef parameter names too ]"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-93231",
"lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:21:00.820",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-24T16:17:18.637",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d72e78c9d38d5377a059a4837f82b65b91cdcf6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21bcb609e0ab1dd60f39ca3498f85808933bcc9f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4fe2db296c9cd897dd1fe06cc0ae9cbc13beefc5"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68282cbc197b280711f66c4cf05165f911785bcc"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9060689f49dc663e9a3d069c4a65ff63a836e66"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfbf21d21aea1a83d5ff38d50466a655e0a6a31d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d34c2ac447fe0490ede828e0143e2cbcb59e6c77"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7124d223c5a2dfb4c1a7b2eea24375edc355a10"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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