FKIE_CVE-2026-93197

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:18 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memcg: move LRU size accounting on reparenting instead of copying it When a memory cgroup is offlined its LRU folios are reparented to the parent. lruvec_reparent_lru() splices the child's lists into the parent's and credits the parent with the child's per-zone lru_zone_size[], but never clears the child's copy, so the size is copied rather than moved. lru_gen_reparent_memcg() does the same for MGLRU. The parent is left correct, credited with exactly the folios it took over. The stale value sits on the child and nothing will correct it: folio->memcg_data now resolves to the parent, so every later update_lru_size() for those folios goes there. Dying cgroups are not freed immediately and mem_cgroup_iter() still walks them, so shrink_lruvec() keeps being called on them. get_scan_count() reads the phantom counter through lruvec_lru_size() and the scan loop then grinds through nr[] in SWAP_CLUSTER_MAX steps against an empty list, for as long as the dead cgroup lives. Under MGLRU the MGLRU scanner runs instead, but count_shadow_nodes() sums all of NR_LRU_LISTS through lruvec_lru_size() and over-budgets the shadow node limit just the same. On one 251 GiB host a sweep of every mz->lru_zone_size[] found 380 counters describing folios on no list at all: 124777314 pages, 476 GiB, 1.89x the machine's RAM, across 57 cgroups. All were on memcgs with CSS_DYING set and CSS_ONLINE clear, and parent/child pairs reported byte-identical sizes. LRU_UNEVICTABLE needs its size moved too. Its list is deliberately not spliced because lruvec_init() poisons the head - the unevictable LRU is imaginary and folios are never threaded on it - but the size is kept by lruvec_add_folio()/lruvec_del_folio() and those folios account to the parent from here on. This depends on commit bf4ade7dbd76 ("memcg: keep folio's objcg same as its node") and must not be backported ahead of it. Without that invariant a folio's objcg can belong to another node, so a folio already spliced onto the parent's list can still resolve to the child's lruvec until the objcg's node is reparented in a later iteration of memcg_reparent_objcgs(); clearing the child's counter early then lets lruvec_del_folio() underflow it and trip the WARN_ONCE()/VM_BUG_ON() in mem_cgroup_update_lru_size().
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/007bc1842317bb99f5f6205afede940f951674c2
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e0ac326c511d514817cc7b6d7741afd59098ce2
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/folio.c",
            "mm/vmscan.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "007bc1842317bb99f5f6205afede940f951674c2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "07a6e9a2c199fed361f528781284d56771d0016f",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "0e0ac326c511d514817cc7b6d7741afd59098ce2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "07a6e9a2c199fed361f528781284d56771d0016f",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/folio.c",
            "mm/vmscan.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.1"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.1",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmemcg: move LRU size accounting on reparenting instead of copying it\n\nWhen a memory cgroup is offlined its LRU folios are reparented to the\nparent.  lruvec_reparent_lru() splices the child\u0027s lists into the\nparent\u0027s and credits the parent with the child\u0027s per-zone\nlru_zone_size[], but never clears the child\u0027s copy, so the size is\ncopied rather than moved.  lru_gen_reparent_memcg() does the same for\nMGLRU.\n\nThe parent is left correct, credited with exactly the folios it took\nover.  The stale value sits on the child and nothing will correct it:\nfolio-\u003ememcg_data now resolves to the parent, so every later\nupdate_lru_size() for those folios goes there.\n\nDying cgroups are not freed immediately and mem_cgroup_iter() still\nwalks them, so shrink_lruvec() keeps being called on them.\nget_scan_count() reads the phantom counter through lruvec_lru_size() and\nthe scan loop then grinds through nr[] in SWAP_CLUSTER_MAX steps against\nan empty list, for as long as the dead cgroup lives.  Under MGLRU the\nMGLRU scanner runs instead, but count_shadow_nodes() sums all of\nNR_LRU_LISTS through lruvec_lru_size() and over-budgets the shadow node\nlimit just the same.\n\nOn one 251 GiB host a sweep of every mz-\u003elru_zone_size[] found 380\ncounters describing folios on no list at all: 124777314 pages, 476 GiB,\n1.89x the machine\u0027s RAM, across 57 cgroups.  All were on memcgs with\nCSS_DYING set and CSS_ONLINE clear, and parent/child pairs reported\nbyte-identical sizes.\n\nLRU_UNEVICTABLE needs its size moved too.  Its list is deliberately not\nspliced because lruvec_init() poisons the head - the unevictable LRU is\nimaginary and folios are never threaded on it - but the size is kept by\nlruvec_add_folio()/lruvec_del_folio() and those folios account to the\nparent from here on.\n\nThis depends on commit bf4ade7dbd76 (\"memcg: keep folio\u0027s objcg same as\nits node\") and must not be backported ahead of it.  Without that\ninvariant a folio\u0027s objcg can belong to another node, so a folio already\nspliced onto the parent\u0027s list can still resolve to the child\u0027s lruvec\nuntil the objcg\u0027s node is reparented in a later iteration of\nmemcg_reparent_objcgs(); clearing the child\u0027s counter early then lets\nlruvec_del_folio() underflow it and trip the WARN_ONCE()/VM_BUG_ON() in\nmem_cgroup_update_lru_size()."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-93197",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:17:10.377",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-09-17T17:18:15.990",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/007bc1842317bb99f5f6205afede940f951674c2"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e0ac326c511d514817cc7b6d7741afd59098ce2"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.