FKIE_CVE-2026-93124

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:18 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: asus-wireless: Fail probe when there is no ACPI match Every platform driver can be forced to match a device that does not match its list of device IDs because of device_match_driver_override(), so platform drivers that rely on the existence of a device ACPI companion object need to verify its presence. asus_wireless_probe() returns success when acpi_match_acpi_device() finds no match, leaving behind an input device that never reports anything because the notify handler is not installed. Worse, when the driver is force-bound to a device without an ACPI companion, probe still succeeds and stores a NULL companion pointer, which asus_wireless_remove() later passes to acpi_dev_remove_notify_handler(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference on unbind. Return -ENODEV when the device does not match the ID table. This also covers the missing-companion case, because acpi_match_acpi_device() rejects a NULL device. Perform the check before allocating any driver state, instead of after the input device has already been registered.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4aefd66ef7822cf7d3f53146dcee0b71021ed2b7
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bfa711f311a584002e16ecd750627306deb805c
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/platform/x86/asus-wireless.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "7bfa711f311a584002e16ecd750627306deb805c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "f7e648027d7e1b5c06eb86d944b7e23926254cee",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4aefd66ef7822cf7d3f53146dcee0b71021ed2b7",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "f7e648027d7e1b5c06eb86d944b7e23926254cee",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/platform/x86/asus-wireless.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.1"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.1",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nplatform/x86: asus-wireless: Fail probe when there is no ACPI match\n\nEvery platform driver can be forced to match a device that does not match\nits list of device IDs because of device_match_driver_override(), so\nplatform drivers that rely on the existence of a device ACPI companion\nobject need to verify its presence.\n\nasus_wireless_probe() returns success when acpi_match_acpi_device()\nfinds no match, leaving behind an input device that never reports\nanything because the notify handler is not installed.  Worse, when the\ndriver is force-bound to a device without an ACPI companion, probe\nstill succeeds and stores a NULL companion pointer, which\nasus_wireless_remove() later passes to acpi_dev_remove_notify_handler(),\nleading to a NULL pointer dereference on unbind.\n\nReturn -ENODEV when the device does not match the ID table.  This also\ncovers the missing-companion case, because acpi_match_acpi_device()\nrejects a NULL device.  Perform the check before allocating any driver\nstate, instead of after the input device has already been registered."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-93124",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:17:02.433",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-09-17T17:18:07.137",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4aefd66ef7822cf7d3f53146dcee0b71021ed2b7"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bfa711f311a584002e16ecd750627306deb805c"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.