FKIE_CVE-2026-93116

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:18 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:20
Severity
7.0 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: asus-wmi: fix resource leaks on probe failure During driver initialization in asus_wmi_add(), various subsystems are registered sequentially. However, the error path labels are out of order relative to the registration sequence. Specifically: 1. If asus_wmi_custom_fan_curve_init() fails, the driver jumps to fail_custom_fan_curve. Because this label is placed below fail_sysfs, it bypasses the cleanup calls for the input device and sysfs groups, which were successfully registered before, leaking those resources. 2. If asus_screenpad_init() fails, the driver jumps to fail_screenpad. Because fail_screenpad is placed below fail_backlight, it bypasses the cleanup calls for backlight and rfkill, leaking those resources. Fix these resource leaks by reordering the error path labels in asus_wmi_add() to match the exact reverse order of the resource allocations.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3308b8c5f5a28403611a2f5a46f06aabe4f0c661
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72d792c8053f238ae541fdaa90e609548509b65f
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8410cd2690d463b60527d00ac8cffea2d5a041f6
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d5999608da60db45949e5459f74f581cdaacd04
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/959ed35f8c8f07b8dd43c3f917a43ae2f77e4471
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef3daa2b84a2b8499ce9e2ce1c865dca36d39f95
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "72d792c8053f238ae541fdaa90e609548509b65f",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0f0ac158d28ff78e75c334e869b1cb8e69372a1f",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "959ed35f8c8f07b8dd43c3f917a43ae2f77e4471",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0f0ac158d28ff78e75c334e869b1cb8e69372a1f",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "8d5999608da60db45949e5459f74f581cdaacd04",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0f0ac158d28ff78e75c334e869b1cb8e69372a1f",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "8410cd2690d463b60527d00ac8cffea2d5a041f6",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0f0ac158d28ff78e75c334e869b1cb8e69372a1f",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3308b8c5f5a28403611a2f5a46f06aabe4f0c661",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0f0ac158d28ff78e75c334e869b1cb8e69372a1f",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ef3daa2b84a2b8499ce9e2ce1c865dca36d39f95",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0f0ac158d28ff78e75c334e869b1cb8e69372a1f",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.17"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.17",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.191",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.160",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.114",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.57",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nplatform/x86: asus-wmi: fix resource leaks on probe failure\n\nDuring driver initialization in asus_wmi_add(), various subsystems are\nregistered sequentially. However, the error path labels are out of order\nrelative to the registration sequence.\n\nSpecifically:\n1. If asus_wmi_custom_fan_curve_init() fails, the driver jumps to\n   fail_custom_fan_curve. Because this label is placed below fail_sysfs,\n   it bypasses the cleanup calls for the input device and sysfs groups,\n   which were successfully registered before, leaking those resources.\n2. If asus_screenpad_init() fails, the driver jumps to fail_screenpad.\n   Because fail_screenpad is placed below fail_backlight, it bypasses the\n   cleanup calls for backlight and rfkill, leaking those resources.\n\nFix these resource leaks by reordering the error path labels in\nasus_wmi_add() to match the exact reverse order of the resource\nallocations."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-93116",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:20:57.660",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.0,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.0,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-17T17:18:06.200",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3308b8c5f5a28403611a2f5a46f06aabe4f0c661"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72d792c8053f238ae541fdaa90e609548509b65f"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8410cd2690d463b60527d00ac8cffea2d5a041f6"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d5999608da60db45949e5459f74f581cdaacd04"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/959ed35f8c8f07b8dd43c3f917a43ae2f77e4471"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef3daa2b84a2b8499ce9e2ce1c865dca36d39f95"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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