FKIE_CVE-2026-9273
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-05 06:16 - Updated: 2026-08-12 21:00| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Membership Plugin \u2013 Kadence Memberships",
"vendor": "stellarwp",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "4.0.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Membership Plugin \u2013 Kadence Memberships plugin for WordPress (formerly Restrict Content) is vulnerable to password reset link poisoning leading to account takeover in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.0. This is due to the legacy lost-password handler rc_process_lost_password_form() consuming the attacker-controlled rc_redirect POST parameter into two unvalidated sinks in legacy/includes/forms.php: wp_redirect( esc_url( $_POST[\u0027rc_redirect\u0027] ) . ... ) at line 243, and add_query_arg( array( \u0027key\u0027 =\u003e $key, \u0027login\u0027 =\u003e ... ), $_POST[\u0027rc_redirect\u0027] ) inside rc_send_password_reset_email() at line 306. The nonce required to reach the handler is broadcast by the public [login_form] shortcode at line 207 to any anonymous visitor. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to issue a password-reset request for any account (including administrators) whose reset email body points the victim at an attacker-controlled host carrying a valid reset key/login. When the victim clicks the link, the reset key leaks to the attacker, who can replay it against the legitimate site to complete account takeover."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-9273",
"lastModified": "2026-08-12T21:00:37.147",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 9.3,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.8,
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-9273",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-05T14:12:57.690592Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-05T06:16:40.967",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/restrict-content/tags/4.0.0/legacy/includes/forms.php#L207"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/restrict-content/tags/4.0.0/legacy/includes/forms.php#L243"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/restrict-content/tags/4.0.0/legacy/includes/forms.php#L306"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/restrict-content/trunk/legacy/includes/forms.php#L243"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/restrict-content/trunk/legacy/includes/forms.php#L306"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?new=3549742%40restrict-content%2Ftags%2F4.0.1\u0026old=3529319%40restrict-content%2Ftags%2F4.0.0"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ca38c423-2df8-4f20-bd95-2ecd84167a7f?source=cve"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-640"
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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