FKIE_CVE-2026-92501

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: drain in-flight DIO before buffered write fallback generic/746 started failing intermittently on ext3 (no-extent inodes). The test triggers 'Page cache invalidation failure on direct I/O' warnings and subsequent fsync returns -EIO. Adding a 50ms delay between ext4_buffered_write_iter() and filemap_write_and_wait_range() in ext4_dio_write_iter() makes the race almost always reproducible. On no-extent inodes, DIO writes to holes cannot use unwritten extents, so ext4_iomap_alloc() leaves m_flags=0 and ext4_map_blocks() returns 0. The iomap layer then returns -ENOTBLK, causing fallback to buffered I/O. The fallback path in ext4_dio_write_iter() calls ext4_buffered_write_iter() which dirties pages, then does flush and invalidate. However, there's an unprotected window between ext4_buffered_write_iter() returning (with inode lock released) and the subsequent flush+invalidate. Concurrent async DIO completions from other threads can run kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write() during this window. If pages have been re-dirtied, post-invalidation finds dirty pages and triggers the warning, setting -EIO in the error sequence. Consider a file with two 4k extents: [hole][written]. Thread A does DIO to the written extent, while thread B does DIO spanning both: kworker A (4k DIO, allocated block) kworker B (8k DIO, fallback) ----------------------------------- ---------------------------- inode_lock_shared() inode_lock_shared() iomap_dio_rw(): iomap_dio_rw(): kiocb_invalidate_pages -> clean iomap_begin -> -ENOTBLK submit_bio (async) dio->size = 0 inode_unlock_shared() inode_unlock_shared() [bio pending in block layer] /* fallback: lock released */ ext4_buffered_write_iter() inode_lock(exclusive) generic_perform_write() -> dirty pages [0, 8k] inode_unlock(exclusive) /* pages dirty, no lock */ [bio completes] filemap_write_and_wait_range() iomap_dio_complete() -> flush dirty pages kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write() invalidate_mapping_pages() invalidate_inode_pages2_range() -> finds dirty page! -> dio_warn_stale_pagecache() -> errseq_set(-EIO) This issue can be triggered through normal I/O paths, not just intentionally overlapping DIO writes from userspace. For example, generic/746 uses a loop device where multiple kworkers issue concurrent I/O to the backing file. Additionally, when block_size < folio_size, non-overlapping DIO writes that share a large folio can also trigger the race. Add inode_dio_wait() in ext4_buffered_write_iter() before ext4_write_checks() to drain all in-flight DIO. This ensures that all DIO clears existing pages before submitting IO (via kiocb_invalidate_pages()), all BIO waits for all DIO to complete (via inode_dio_wait()), and ext4_write_checks() observes the inode size after all completed DIO so that ext4_block_zero_eof() does not race with in-flight DIO, thus eliminating the race.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15cdefd0c0522f9d5e12d947fa04f4c11649b699
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e4e3eec506247c8f8bd8aaa1eb25e67016681a5
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7341e234927ff215f1d5d0bcfe04b74f53af378d
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74eee4ff9698a65b2e6e15dac0e50d6526ad5f20
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fd3ffc3c51c9deaba99bd7b338fff2d08f52416
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d47cdadd6e49023f7ee248048463807f1214f1ee
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0af3ae09fb72382da1a5371bf6761b0264668e4
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd7e0dab20837b9ea1eeef7c26f78ace8ac8258c
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/ext4/file.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "fd7e0dab20837b9ea1eeef7c26f78ace8ac8258c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "378f32bab3714f04c4e0c3aee4129f6703805550",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f0af3ae09fb72382da1a5371bf6761b0264668e4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "378f32bab3714f04c4e0c3aee4129f6703805550",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7341e234927ff215f1d5d0bcfe04b74f53af378d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "378f32bab3714f04c4e0c3aee4129f6703805550",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "74eee4ff9698a65b2e6e15dac0e50d6526ad5f20",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "378f32bab3714f04c4e0c3aee4129f6703805550",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "d47cdadd6e49023f7ee248048463807f1214f1ee",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "378f32bab3714f04c4e0c3aee4129f6703805550",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4e4e3eec506247c8f8bd8aaa1eb25e67016681a5",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "378f32bab3714f04c4e0c3aee4129f6703805550",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "9fd3ffc3c51c9deaba99bd7b338fff2d08f52416",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "378f32bab3714f04c4e0c3aee4129f6703805550",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "15cdefd0c0522f9d5e12d947fa04f4c11649b699",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "378f32bab3714f04c4e0c3aee4129f6703805550",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/ext4/file.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.5"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.5",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.10.270",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.15.221",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.188",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.157",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.110",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.52",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\next4: drain in-flight DIO before buffered write fallback\n\ngeneric/746 started failing intermittently on ext3 (no-extent inodes).\nThe test triggers \u0027Page cache invalidation failure on direct I/O\u0027\nwarnings and subsequent fsync returns -EIO. Adding a 50ms delay\nbetween ext4_buffered_write_iter() and filemap_write_and_wait_range()\nin ext4_dio_write_iter() makes the race almost always reproducible.\n\nOn no-extent inodes, DIO writes to holes cannot use unwritten extents,\nso ext4_iomap_alloc() leaves m_flags=0 and ext4_map_blocks() returns 0.\nThe iomap layer then returns -ENOTBLK, causing fallback to buffered I/O.\n\nThe fallback path in ext4_dio_write_iter() calls\next4_buffered_write_iter() which dirties pages, then does flush and\ninvalidate. However, there\u0027s an unprotected window between\next4_buffered_write_iter() returning (with inode lock released) and\nthe subsequent flush+invalidate.\n\nConcurrent async DIO completions from other threads can run\nkiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write() during this window. If pages have\nbeen re-dirtied, post-invalidation finds dirty pages and triggers the\nwarning, setting -EIO in the error sequence.\n\nConsider a file with two 4k extents: [hole][written]. Thread A does\nDIO to the written extent, while thread B does DIO spanning both:\n\n  kworker A (4k DIO, allocated block)    kworker B (8k DIO, fallback)\n  -----------------------------------    ----------------------------\n  inode_lock_shared()                    inode_lock_shared()\n  iomap_dio_rw():                        iomap_dio_rw():\n    kiocb_invalidate_pages -\u003e clean        iomap_begin -\u003e -ENOTBLK\n    submit_bio (async)                     dio-\u003esize = 0\n  inode_unlock_shared()                  inode_unlock_shared()\n\n  [bio pending in block layer]           /* fallback: lock released */\n                                         ext4_buffered_write_iter()\n                                           inode_lock(exclusive)\n                                           generic_perform_write()\n                                             -\u003e dirty pages [0, 8k]\n                                           inode_unlock(exclusive)\n\n                                         /* pages dirty, no lock */\n  [bio completes]                        filemap_write_and_wait_range()\n  iomap_dio_complete()                     -\u003e flush dirty pages\n    kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write() invalidate_mapping_pages()\n      invalidate_inode_pages2_range()\n      -\u003e finds dirty page!\n      -\u003e dio_warn_stale_pagecache()\n      -\u003e errseq_set(-EIO)\n\nThis issue can be triggered through normal I/O paths, not just\nintentionally overlapping DIO writes from userspace. For example,\ngeneric/746 uses a loop device where multiple kworkers issue concurrent\nI/O to the backing file. Additionally, when block_size \u003c folio_size,\nnon-overlapping DIO writes that share a large folio can also trigger\nthe race.\n\nAdd inode_dio_wait() in ext4_buffered_write_iter() before\next4_write_checks() to drain all in-flight DIO. This ensures that\nall DIO clears existing pages before submitting IO (via\nkiocb_invalidate_pages()), all BIO waits for all DIO to complete\n(via inode_dio_wait()), and ext4_write_checks() observes the inode\nsize after all completed DIO so that ext4_block_zero_eof() does not\nrace with in-flight DIO, thus eliminating the race."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-92501",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:19:40.347",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-09-17T17:17:52.517",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15cdefd0c0522f9d5e12d947fa04f4c11649b699"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e4e3eec506247c8f8bd8aaa1eb25e67016681a5"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7341e234927ff215f1d5d0bcfe04b74f53af378d"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74eee4ff9698a65b2e6e15dac0e50d6526ad5f20"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fd3ffc3c51c9deaba99bd7b338fff2d08f52416"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d47cdadd6e49023f7ee248048463807f1214f1ee"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0af3ae09fb72382da1a5371bf6761b0264668e4"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd7e0dab20837b9ea1eeef7c26f78ace8ac8258c"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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