FKIE_CVE-2026-9180

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-03 06:16 - Updated: 2026-07-03 06:16
Severity
5.3 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Summary
The MotoPress Appointment Booking plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.4. This is due to the `POST /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings` REST endpoint being registered with `'permission_callback' => '__return_true'`, allowing unauthenticated access, while the `createBooking` handler in `BookingsRestController.php` accepts an attacker-supplied `payment_details.booking_id` value and loads the referenced booking via `findById()` without verifying that the caller owns or has any rights to that booking. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the customer name, email address, phone number, and `customer_id` of any non-confirmed victim booking by submitting a request with no reservation items, causing `BookingService::createBooking()` to load the existing victim booking object and persist it with attacker-controlled customer data. Victim booking IDs can be harvested prior to exploitation without authentication by querying the also-publicly-accessible `GET /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings/reservations` endpoint with a guessable `service_id` and date range, and only bookings whose status is not `STATUS_CONFIRMED` (e.g., pending or auto-draft) are valid targets.
References
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/motopress-appointment-lite/tags/2.4.3/includes/rest/controllers/motopress/appointment/v1/BookingsRestController.php#L30
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/motopress-appointment-lite/tags/2.4.3/includes/rest/controllers/motopress/appointment/v1/BookingsRestController.php#L308
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/motopress-appointment-lite/tags/2.4.3/includes/rest/controllers/motopress/appointment/v1/BookingsRestController.php#L98
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/motopress-appointment-lite/tags/2.4.3/includes/services/BookingService.php#L29
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3583168/motopress-appointment-lite/trunk/includes/rest/controllers/motopress/appointment/v1/BookingsRestController.php
security@wordfence.comhttps://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/e9a6521d-39b2-48f4-834b-888047619df5?source=cve
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "MotoPress Appointment Booking",
          "vendor": "jetmonsters",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "2.4.4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The MotoPress Appointment Booking plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.4. This is due to the `POST /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings` REST endpoint being registered with `\u0027permission_callback\u0027 =\u003e \u0027__return_true\u0027`, allowing unauthenticated access, while the `createBooking` handler in `BookingsRestController.php` accepts an attacker-supplied `payment_details.booking_id` value and loads the referenced booking via `findById()` without verifying that the caller owns or has any rights to that booking. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the customer name, email address, phone number, and `customer_id` of any non-confirmed victim booking by submitting a request with no reservation items, causing `BookingService::createBooking()` to load the existing victim booking object and persist it with attacker-controlled customer data. Victim booking IDs can be harvested prior to exploitation without authentication by querying the also-publicly-accessible `GET /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings/reservations` endpoint with a guessable `service_id` and date range, and only bookings whose status is not `STATUS_CONFIRMED` (e.g., pending or auto-draft) are valid targets."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-9180",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-03T06:16:22.973",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 5.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "security@wordfence.com",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-03T06:16:22.973",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/motopress-appointment-lite/tags/2.4.3/includes/rest/controllers/motopress/appointment/v1/BookingsRestController.php#L30"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/motopress-appointment-lite/tags/2.4.3/includes/rest/controllers/motopress/appointment/v1/BookingsRestController.php#L308"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/motopress-appointment-lite/tags/2.4.3/includes/rest/controllers/motopress/appointment/v1/BookingsRestController.php#L98"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/motopress-appointment-lite/tags/2.4.3/includes/services/BookingService.php#L29"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3583168/motopress-appointment-lite/trunk/includes/rest/controllers/motopress/appointment/v1/BookingsRestController.php"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/e9a6521d-39b2-48f4-834b-888047619df5?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-639"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.