FKIE_CVE-2026-90651
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-13 00:17 - Updated: 2026-09-22 20:00
Severity
Summary
Socket Firewall (socketdev/socket-registry-firewall) in registry mode before 2.0.0 does not verify upstream TLS certificates by default. When the api_ssl_verify and upstream_ssl_verify configuration keys are omitted from socket.yml, the generated configuration sets SOCKET_API_SSL_VERIFY='false' and UPSTREAM_SSL_VERIFY='false', and the OpenResty/Lua HTTP client used for outbound requests accepts any certificate, including self-signed and otherwise untrusted certificates, without validating the chain. An attacker positioned to intercept traffic between Socket Firewall and the Socket API or an upstream package registry can present a crafted certificate and modify responses in transit, including substituting malicious package content or altering the allow/block decisions the firewall enforces. Setting api_ssl_verify: true and upstream_ssl_verify: true enables verification; however, in versions before 1.1.334, the generated nginx configuration did not emit lua_ssl_trusted_certificate, and thus verification could not be used successfully without manually patching the generated configuration. Version 2.0.0 changes the default for both settings to true.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://hub.docker.com",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"registry mode; outbound TLS to Socket API and upstream package registries (OpenResty/Lua HTTP client)"
],
"packageName": "socketdev/socket-registry-firewall",
"product": "Socket Firewall",
"vendor": "Socket",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2.0.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Socket Firewall (socketdev/socket-registry-firewall) in registry mode before 2.0.0 does not verify upstream TLS certificates by default. When the api_ssl_verify and upstream_ssl_verify configuration keys are omitted from socket.yml, the generated configuration sets SOCKET_API_SSL_VERIFY=\u0027false\u0027 and UPSTREAM_SSL_VERIFY=\u0027false\u0027, and the OpenResty/Lua HTTP client used for outbound requests accepts any certificate, including self-signed and otherwise untrusted certificates, without validating the chain. An attacker positioned to intercept traffic between Socket Firewall and the Socket API or an upstream package registry can present a crafted certificate and modify responses in transit, including substituting malicious package content or altering the allow/block decisions the firewall enforces. Setting api_ssl_verify: true and upstream_ssl_verify: true enables verification; however, in versions before 1.1.334, the generated nginx configuration did not emit lua_ssl_trusted_certificate, and thus verification could not be used successfully without manually patching the generated configuration. Version 2.0.0 changes the default for both settings to true."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90651",
"lastModified": "2026-09-22T20:00:03.713",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 5.3,
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-90651",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-14T14:56:54.408892Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-13T00:17:07.203",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://docs.socket.dev/docs/registry-mode-configuration-reference"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://github.com/SocketDev/socket-registry-firewall/releases/tag/v2.0.0"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-295"
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Loading…
Loading…
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.