FKIE_CVE-2026-90429
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:19| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu-v3/tegra241-cmdqv.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "bcb82407633c3008362ad927699d985ee4981557",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4dc0d12474f9d4833c3dd96b73d61e406d3f5dc7",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f3ef4abc271a1d3d7b6715879e149c286dc8aae7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4dc0d12474f9d4833c3dd96b73d61e406d3f5dc7",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a491be376abd1c80a314cdd658632c85cd660b73",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4dc0d12474f9d4833c3dd96b73d61e406d3f5dc7",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu-v3/tegra241-cmdqv.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.17"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.17",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.52",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Synchronize the error ISR against VINTF (de)init\n\nA user VINTF is torn down by tegra241_cmdqv_deinit_vintf(), which runs from\nthe destroy callback and from the init-failure unwind in the alloc handler.\nIt clears the cmdqv-\u003evintfs[] slot and lets the iommufd core free it, but\nnothing serializes that against the error interrupt: tegra241_cmdqv_isr()\nreads cmdqv-\u003evintfs[idx] and dereferences the vintf. A concurrent error can\nmake the ISR read a slot mid-clear (a NULL deref) or use a vintf which is\nabout to be freed (a use-after-free).\n\ndeinit_vintf() also returns idx to the IDA before clearing the slot, so a\nconcurrent create that reuses idx can publish its new vintf into the slot,\nonly for this teardown to erase it again with the stale NULL store.\n\nOn the other end, tegra241_cmdqv_init_vintf() publishes a new vintf with a\nplain store to the cmdqv-\u003evintfs[] slot, and the ISR dereferences fields of\na published vintf such as vintf-\u003ebase. A plain store gives no ordering on a\nweakly-ordered CPU, and a stale VINTF_ERR_MAP bit on a reused idx can make\nthe ISR pick a vintf the moment it is published, before its fields are set\nor tegra241_vintf_hw_init() runs.\n\nThe cmdqv-\u003evintfs[0] slot stays NULL until tegra241_cmdqv_init_structures()\nfirst creates VINTF0, so the slot 0 read needs the same NULL check.\n\nPublish every slot with an smp_store_release(), and read each slot in the\nISR with an smp_load_acquire() under a NULL check, so the ISR always sees\na fully built vintf or NULL. Also make deinit_vintf() clear the slot, and\nsynchronize_irq() prior to returning idx to the IDA, so no vintf is freed\nunder a running handler and no reused idx is clobbered."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90429",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:19:37.190",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:47.850",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a491be376abd1c80a314cdd658632c85cd660b73"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bcb82407633c3008362ad927699d985ee4981557"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3ef4abc271a1d3d7b6715879e149c286dc8aae7"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.