FKIE_CVE-2026-90359
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-09-17 17:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject >8 byte return values on return-reading trampoline paths
btf_distill_func_proto() builds the function model used for the
fentry/fexit/fmod_ret/fsession trampolines and struct_ops. It has
accepted a 16-byte __int128 return value since the trampoline was
introduced: __get_type_size() returns the integer's type size, and the
return-type check only rejected ret < 0.
But the BPF trampoline preserves only 8 bytes of the return value (RAX on
x86, i.e. R0). For an attach type that reads the target's return value the
second half (RDX / R3) is neither saved nor restored, so a program
attached to a function returning a 16-byte value corrupts the value seen
by the real caller and itself observes only half of it. struct_ops
trampolines have the same limitation.
This affects the attach types that read the target's return value: fexit,
fmod_ret and fsession (plus the _multi variants of fexit and fsession),
and struct_ops. fentry/fentry_multi run before the target returns and are
unaffected.
Reject a >8 byte return value for these attach types in
bpf_check_attach_target() and bpf_check_attach_btf_id_multi(), and for
struct_ops in bpf_struct_ops_desc_init().
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c",
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "d36ac53fc83baf843c51b7afd6d2471f36b713d8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "fec56f5890d93fc2ed74166c397dc186b1c25951",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c48796aa6c392cde93946e5d5a9a1f1b1cf72feb",
"status": "affected",
"version": "fec56f5890d93fc2ed74166c397dc186b1c25951",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c",
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.5"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.5",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reject \u003e8 byte return values on return-reading trampoline paths\n\nbtf_distill_func_proto() builds the function model used for the\nfentry/fexit/fmod_ret/fsession trampolines and struct_ops. It has\naccepted a 16-byte __int128 return value since the trampoline was\nintroduced: __get_type_size() returns the integer\u0027s type size, and the\nreturn-type check only rejected ret \u003c 0.\n\nBut the BPF trampoline preserves only 8 bytes of the return value (RAX on\nx86, i.e. R0). For an attach type that reads the target\u0027s return value the\nsecond half (RDX / R3) is neither saved nor restored, so a program\nattached to a function returning a 16-byte value corrupts the value seen\nby the real caller and itself observes only half of it. struct_ops\ntrampolines have the same limitation.\n\nThis affects the attach types that read the target\u0027s return value: fexit,\nfmod_ret and fsession (plus the _multi variants of fexit and fsession),\nand struct_ops. fentry/fentry_multi run before the target returns and are\nunaffected.\n\nReject a \u003e8 byte return value for these attach types in\nbpf_check_attach_target() and bpf_check_attach_btf_id_multi(), and for\nstruct_ops in bpf_struct_ops_desc_init()."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90359",
"lastModified": "2026-09-17T17:17:34.810",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:34.810",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c48796aa6c392cde93946e5d5a9a1f1b1cf72feb"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d36ac53fc83baf843c51b7afd6d2471f36b713d8"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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