{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "7ae71629357d0a6d0bdadb929c7b296d5b7e61c2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5861d1e8dbc4e1a03ebffb96ac041026cdd34c07",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "180c7000712db77063b3a26f4c97e7dd9038f449",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5861d1e8dbc4e1a03ebffb96ac041026cdd34c07",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.6"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.6",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.6",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.6",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3-rc1",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.6",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Invalidate RCU pointers after final spin unlock\n\nIn a sleepable BPF program, a spin lock can provide the only RCU protection\nfor a kptr. The final bpf_spin_unlock() ends that protection, but the\nverifier leaves the pointer valid. Another CPU can then free the object\nbefore the pointer is used. A capability-limited runtime PoC triggered a\ntask_struct use-after-free in __bpf_get_task_stack().\n\nRecord whether the program is in an RCU-protected context before releasing\nthe lock. Invalidate RCU-protected pointers only when the unlock leaves the\nfinal such context. This preserves valid pointers in non-sleepable programs\nand inside an explicit RCU read-side section."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The attacker-controlled input is a sleepable BPF program loaded via bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD) whose bytecode reaches process_spin_lock() in kernel/bpf/verifier.c, takes bpf_spin_lock, LDXes a map kptr, then bpf_spin_unlock. That program image arrives through the local bpf() syscall, not a network protocol message.\nAC:L - The attacker drives both sides: a sleepable fentry.s or BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL program loads a task kptr under bpf_spin_lock, unlocks, then uses it, while another thread bpf_kptr_xchg\u0027s the same slot to NULL so bpf_task_release_dtor/put_task_struct_rcu_user can call_rcu it. After unlock, preempt/IRQs are re-enabled so the grace period can finish; a PoC hit the UAF.\nPR:L - A sleepable BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL program is sufficient: bpf_prog_load() requires only bpf_token_capable(CAP_BPF) because is_perfmon_prog_type() is false for SYSCALL, and map_check_btf() needs CAP_BPF for BPF_SPIN_LOCK|BPF_KPTR fields. CAP_BPF is delegable via BPF tokens into a user namespace; the report used a capability-limited PoC, not init-namespace root.\nUI:N - The attacker loads the sleepable program, creates the lock+kptr ARRAY map, stores a task with bpf_task_from_pid/bpf_kptr_xchg, and runs it via bpf(BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN) (bpf_prog_test_run_syscall) or by calling getpgid after attaching fentry.s; no victim mount or file open is required.\nS:U - The use-after-free is of a host kernel task_struct consumed by bpf_task_acquire and __bpf_get_task_stack in the same kernel that accepted the program. That is local privilege escalation inside one kernel authority, not a VM, IOMMU, or guest-to-host crossing.\nC:H - After the final bpf_spin_unlock, process_spin_lock() leaves the map-loaded task kptr as MEM_RCU, so the program can LDX task_struct fields or call bpf_task_acquire (refcount_inc_not_zero on rcu_users) and __bpf_get_task_stack (try_get_task_stack/task_pt_regs) on a call_rcu-freed object. Spraying that slot yields an arbitrary kernel read.\nI:H - The same stale MEM_RCU task_struct pointer can be passed to bpf_task_acquire after bpf_task_release_dtor has dropped rcu_users and delayed_put_task_struct has freed it; a sprayed replacement becomes an owned kptr the attacker can feed to other kfuncs or store back with bpf_kptr_xchg, giving a write and control-flow primitive.\nA:H - Using the dangling task pointer in __bpf_get_task_stack (try_get_task_stack/task_pt_regs) or bpf_task_acquire after put_task_struct_rcu_user\u0027s call_rcu has run oopses or panics the kernel even without a full exploit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-18T17:54:32.573Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ae71629357d0a6d0bdadb929c7b296d5b7e61c2"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/180c7000712db77063b3a26f4c97e7dd9038f449"
        }
      ],
      "title": "bpf: Invalidate RCU pointers after final spin unlock",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-90317",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-17T16:08:35.537Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.801Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-18T17:54:32.573Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}