FKIE_CVE-2026-90301

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:20
Severity
8.1 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: o2hb: quiesce negotiate handlers and timeout work Heartbeat regions publish struct o2hb_region as the private data for the NEGO_TIMEOUT and NEGO_APPROVE o2net handlers as soon as make_item() creates the configfs region. The approve handler can call o2hb_arm_timeout(), so a peer can touch the region timeout work before dev_store() has finished building the heartbeat runtime, or after teardown has started to shut that runtime back down. The final configfs put also has to keep reg alive until the last in-flight o2net callback drops its handler reference. o2net_unregister_handler_list() blocks future handler lookups, but it does not wait for sc_rx_work that already passed o2net_handler_get(). That drain needs to cover local listener teardown as well, where the o2net ordered workqueue may already be inside destroy_workqueue(). Fix the lifetime rule in both directions. Initialize the region delayed works before publishing reg through the o2net handler table, keep new or stopping regions non-armable with hr_stopping, and quiesce both delayed works on failed-start and teardown paths even when no heartbeat thread is left to call o2hb_disarm_timeout(). Then unregister handlers before tearing down handler-visible region state and make the drain wait for the active or destroying o2net ordered workqueue before release frees reg. The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path: region lifecycle: late negotiate callback: 1. make_item() registers the 1. o2net_process_message() gets a region handlers before heartbeat handler for reg. dev_store() has built a 2. The callback runs after the lookup runnable heartbeat context. lock is dropped and dereferences reg. 2. A failed start or rmdir 3. An approve or timeout path tries to stops the heartbeat thread, queue reg's delayed work, or release quiesces existing work, and races the callback body after handler drops the final configfs ref. unregister. 3. region_release() must drain 4. The callback or delayed work can handler-visible o2net rx work outlive reg unless lifecycle code before freeing reg. keeps the region non-armable and drains the active-or-destroying o2net workqueue. Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN slab-use-after-free in __run_timers+0x22c/0x5b0 Write of size 8 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x630 __run_timers+0x22c/0x5b0 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x27/0x60 try_to_wake_up+0x191/0xf70 timer_expire_remote+0xae/0xf0 run_timer_softirq+0x19b/0x1a0 handle_softirqs+0x156/0x660 __irq_exit_rcu+0xc4/0x160 irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 Allocated by task stack: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 o2hb_heartbeat_group_make_item+0x3c/0x600
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/011291b70ba4832e136b7b581825b2bc0f525bf6
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d44822ba34d6035690f725f9de602744a6e1946
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5a2907bdeced0949bcddc84b95ba7d4cb93841b
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b672d4de13247369c8dc394ba83f2a896d9cc25c
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed3c9aebd6bb5aa6ccc2a9177fab7a87ae895715
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f218d70f27bb326f5e9b2f33503e253851b3bafa
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c",
            "fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.c",
            "fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "ed3c9aebd6bb5aa6ccc2a9177fab7a87ae895715",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "34069b886f95356d68bf8315fa648c4ab3193cdd",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b672d4de13247369c8dc394ba83f2a896d9cc25c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "34069b886f95356d68bf8315fa648c4ab3193cdd",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f218d70f27bb326f5e9b2f33503e253851b3bafa",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "34069b886f95356d68bf8315fa648c4ab3193cdd",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "9d44822ba34d6035690f725f9de602744a6e1946",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "34069b886f95356d68bf8315fa648c4ab3193cdd",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b5a2907bdeced0949bcddc84b95ba7d4cb93841b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "34069b886f95356d68bf8315fa648c4ab3193cdd",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "011291b70ba4832e136b7b581825b2bc0f525bf6",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "34069b886f95356d68bf8315fa648c4ab3193cdd",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c",
            "fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.c",
            "fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.7"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.7",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.191",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.160",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.114",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.57",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: o2hb: quiesce negotiate handlers and timeout work\n\nHeartbeat regions publish struct o2hb_region as the private data for the\nNEGO_TIMEOUT and NEGO_APPROVE o2net handlers as soon as make_item()\ncreates the configfs region.  The approve handler can call\no2hb_arm_timeout(), so a peer can touch the region timeout work before\ndev_store() has finished building the heartbeat runtime, or after teardown\nhas started to shut that runtime back down.\n\nThe final configfs put also has to keep reg alive until the last in-flight\no2net callback drops its handler reference. \no2net_unregister_handler_list() blocks future handler lookups, but it does\nnot wait for sc_rx_work that already passed o2net_handler_get().  That\ndrain needs to cover local listener teardown as well, where the o2net\nordered workqueue may already be inside destroy_workqueue().\n\nFix the lifetime rule in both directions.  Initialize the region delayed\nworks before publishing reg through the o2net handler table, keep new or\nstopping regions non-armable with hr_stopping, and quiesce both delayed\nworks on failed-start and teardown paths even when no heartbeat thread is\nleft to call o2hb_disarm_timeout().  Then unregister handlers before\ntearing down handler-visible region state and make the drain wait for the\nactive or destroying o2net ordered workqueue before release frees reg.\n\nThe buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order\nwithin that path:\n\nregion lifecycle:                late negotiate callback:\n1. make_item() registers the     1. o2net_process_message() gets a\n   region handlers before           heartbeat handler for reg.\n   dev_store() has built a       2. The callback runs after the lookup\n   runnable heartbeat context.      lock is dropped and dereferences reg.\n2. A failed start or rmdir       3. An approve or timeout path tries to\n   stops the heartbeat thread,      queue reg\u0027s delayed work, or release\n   quiesces existing work, and      races the callback body after handler\n   drops the final configfs ref.    unregister.\n3. region_release() must drain   4. The callback or delayed work can\n   handler-visible o2net rx work    outlive reg unless lifecycle code\n   before freeing reg.              keeps the region non-armable and\n                                    drains the active-or-destroying\n                                    o2net workqueue.\n\nValidation reproduced this kernel report:\nKASAN slab-use-after-free in __run_timers+0x22c/0x5b0\nWrite of size 8\nCall trace:\n  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0\n  print_report+0xce/0x630\n  __run_timers+0x22c/0x5b0\n  kasan_report+0xe0/0x110\n  _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x27/0x60\n  try_to_wake_up+0x191/0xf70\n  timer_expire_remote+0xae/0xf0\n  run_timer_softirq+0x19b/0x1a0\n  handle_softirqs+0x156/0x660\n  __irq_exit_rcu+0xc4/0x160\n  irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20\n  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80\n  asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20\n\nAllocated by task stack:\n  kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60\n  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n  __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0\n  o2hb_heartbeat_group_make_item+0x3c/0x600"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-90301",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:20:49.060",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-17T17:17:27.603",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/011291b70ba4832e136b7b581825b2bc0f525bf6"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d44822ba34d6035690f725f9de602744a6e1946"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5a2907bdeced0949bcddc84b95ba7d4cb93841b"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b672d4de13247369c8dc394ba83f2a896d9cc25c"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed3c9aebd6bb5aa6ccc2a9177fab7a87ae895715"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f218d70f27bb326f5e9b2f33503e253851b3bafa"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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