FKIE_CVE-2026-90244
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-09-18 18:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/dma: Restore locking around msi_page_list
Unlike a group's default domain, which is always freshly allocated
and privately owned (iommu_group_alloc_default_domain()), VFIO type1's
legacy container merges any newly attached group into an existing
domain whenever their iommu_ops and cache-coherency enforcement match.
iommu_dma_get_msi_page() only asserts the caller's own group mutex is
held (iommu_group_mutex_assert()). On an IOMMU that publishes
IOMMU_RESV_SW_MSI, e.g. ARM SMMU, a VM with two such devices assigned
through the legacy container can have their guest drivers probe and
allocate MSIs in parallel; each host-side VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS lands
on a different device fd and group mutex, but both devices' domains
are the same merged domain, so both can enter
iommu_dma_get_msi_page() concurrently and corrupt msi_page_list.
commit 288683c92b1a ("iommu: Make iommu_dma_prepare_msi() into a
generic operation") dropped the prior msi_prepare_lock on the
reasoning that "each iommu_domain is unique to a group," which holds
for default domains but not this VFIO type1 case. Restore the static
lock, since it's only guarding a corner case and will likely never
be contended.
iommufd avoids the equivalent problem by having its own callers
(iommufd_sw_map_msi()) take a ctx-wide sw_msi_lock before ever
reaching the shared list. VFIO type1 can't mirror that since it
dispatches to iommu_dma_sw_msi() which is outside VFIO's jurisdiction.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "e3c53e9173a47d5ce1fae020f2c6b1fb3c1123c2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "288683c92b1abc32277c83819bea287af614d239",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2af1e99ec14d226d66ceb9f16c663ee2568e6676",
"status": "affected",
"version": "288683c92b1abc32277c83819bea287af614d239",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5a9e89ea34e0e34ac5d7e949042d665533549e40",
"status": "affected",
"version": "288683c92b1abc32277c83819bea287af614d239",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.52",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/dma: Restore locking around msi_page_list\n\nUnlike a group\u0027s default domain, which is always freshly allocated\nand privately owned (iommu_group_alloc_default_domain()), VFIO type1\u0027s\nlegacy container merges any newly attached group into an existing\ndomain whenever their iommu_ops and cache-coherency enforcement match.\n\niommu_dma_get_msi_page() only asserts the caller\u0027s own group mutex is\nheld (iommu_group_mutex_assert()). On an IOMMU that publishes\nIOMMU_RESV_SW_MSI, e.g. ARM SMMU, a VM with two such devices assigned\nthrough the legacy container can have their guest drivers probe and\nallocate MSIs in parallel; each host-side VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS lands\non a different device fd and group mutex, but both devices\u0027 domains\nare the same merged domain, so both can enter\niommu_dma_get_msi_page() concurrently and corrupt msi_page_list.\n\ncommit 288683c92b1a (\"iommu: Make iommu_dma_prepare_msi() into a\ngeneric operation\") dropped the prior msi_prepare_lock on the\nreasoning that \"each iommu_domain is unique to a group,\" which holds\nfor default domains but not this VFIO type1 case. Restore the static\nlock, since it\u0027s only guarding a corner case and will likely never\nbe contended.\n\niommufd avoids the equivalent problem by having its own callers\n(iommufd_sw_map_msi()) take a ctx-wide sw_msi_lock before ever\nreaching the shared list. VFIO type1 can\u0027t mirror that since it\ndispatches to iommu_dma_sw_msi() which is outside VFIO\u0027s jurisdiction."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90244",
"lastModified": "2026-09-18T18:17:50.720",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:20.400",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2af1e99ec14d226d66ceb9f16c663ee2568e6676"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a9e89ea34e0e34ac5d7e949042d665533549e40"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3c53e9173a47d5ce1fae020f2c6b1fb3c1123c2"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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