FKIE_CVE-2026-90244
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:19| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "e3c53e9173a47d5ce1fae020f2c6b1fb3c1123c2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "288683c92b1abc32277c83819bea287af614d239",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2af1e99ec14d226d66ceb9f16c663ee2568e6676",
"status": "affected",
"version": "288683c92b1abc32277c83819bea287af614d239",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5a9e89ea34e0e34ac5d7e949042d665533549e40",
"status": "affected",
"version": "288683c92b1abc32277c83819bea287af614d239",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.52",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/dma: Restore locking around msi_page_list\n\nUnlike a group\u0027s default domain, which is always freshly allocated\nand privately owned (iommu_group_alloc_default_domain()), VFIO type1\u0027s\nlegacy container merges any newly attached group into an existing\ndomain whenever their iommu_ops and cache-coherency enforcement match.\n\niommu_dma_get_msi_page() only asserts the caller\u0027s own group mutex is\nheld (iommu_group_mutex_assert()). On an IOMMU that publishes\nIOMMU_RESV_SW_MSI, e.g. ARM SMMU, a VM with two such devices assigned\nthrough the legacy container can have their guest drivers probe and\nallocate MSIs in parallel; each host-side VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS lands\non a different device fd and group mutex, but both devices\u0027 domains\nare the same merged domain, so both can enter\niommu_dma_get_msi_page() concurrently and corrupt msi_page_list.\n\ncommit 288683c92b1a (\"iommu: Make iommu_dma_prepare_msi() into a\ngeneric operation\") dropped the prior msi_prepare_lock on the\nreasoning that \"each iommu_domain is unique to a group,\" which holds\nfor default domains but not this VFIO type1 case. Restore the static\nlock, since it\u0027s only guarding a corner case and will likely never\nbe contended.\n\niommufd avoids the equivalent problem by having its own callers\n(iommufd_sw_map_msi()) take a ctx-wide sw_msi_lock before ever\nreaching the shared list. VFIO type1 can\u0027t mirror that since it\ndispatches to iommu_dma_sw_msi() which is outside VFIO\u0027s jurisdiction."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90244",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:19:14.897",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:20.400",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2af1e99ec14d226d66ceb9f16c663ee2568e6676"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a9e89ea34e0e34ac5d7e949042d665533549e40"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3c53e9173a47d5ce1fae020f2c6b1fb3c1123c2"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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