FKIE_CVE-2026-90242
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-09-17 17:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Fix iopf_refcount leak on RID domain replacement
intel_iommu_attach_device() enables IOPF for the new domain but never
disables it for the old one. device_block_translation(), called at the
start of the function, tears down translation but does not touch any IOPF
state; blocking_domain_attach_dev() has to call iopf_for_domain_remove()
explicitly before invoking it for exactly this reason.
identity_domain_attach_dev() has the same problem. Its comment claims
that no PRI handling is needed because the device has been put in the
blocking state, but the blocking state and the IOPF reference count are
independent of each other.
As a result, replacing a domain that has an iopf_handler with another
domain at RID level leaks a reference in info->iopf_refcount. The count
never drops back to zero, so iopf_queue_remove_device() is never called
and iommu_disable_pci_pri() triggers its WARN_ON(info->iopf_refcount)
when the device is released.
The PASID paths already handle this correctly by way of
iopf_for_domain_replace(); convert the two RID paths to do the same.
Using the replace helper rather than a bare remove keeps the enable
before the disable, so the reference count does not transiently reach
zero and evict the device from the IOPF queue.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "143cd37ce76527ddd6f6dbac4a89bde31fb8b0dc",
"status": "affected",
"version": "17fce9d2336d952b95474248303e5e7d9777f2e0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "236dd58fabd2e951b940a6ad88b81147899ed311",
"status": "affected",
"version": "17fce9d2336d952b95474248303e5e7d9777f2e0",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/vt-d: Fix iopf_refcount leak on RID domain replacement\n\nintel_iommu_attach_device() enables IOPF for the new domain but never\ndisables it for the old one. device_block_translation(), called at the\nstart of the function, tears down translation but does not touch any IOPF\nstate; blocking_domain_attach_dev() has to call iopf_for_domain_remove()\nexplicitly before invoking it for exactly this reason.\n\nidentity_domain_attach_dev() has the same problem. Its comment claims\nthat no PRI handling is needed because the device has been put in the\nblocking state, but the blocking state and the IOPF reference count are\nindependent of each other.\n\nAs a result, replacing a domain that has an iopf_handler with another\ndomain at RID level leaks a reference in info-\u003eiopf_refcount. The count\nnever drops back to zero, so iopf_queue_remove_device() is never called\nand iommu_disable_pci_pri() triggers its WARN_ON(info-\u003eiopf_refcount)\nwhen the device is released.\n\nThe PASID paths already handle this correctly by way of\niopf_for_domain_replace(); convert the two RID paths to do the same.\nUsing the replace helper rather than a bare remove keeps the enable\nbefore the disable, so the reference count does not transiently reach\nzero and evict the device from the IOPF queue."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90242",
"lastModified": "2026-09-17T17:17:20.190",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:20.190",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/143cd37ce76527ddd6f6dbac4a89bde31fb8b0dc"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/236dd58fabd2e951b940a6ad88b81147899ed311"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
Loading…