FKIE_CVE-2026-90237
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:19| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.h",
"net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c",
"net/netfilter/nft_ct.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "af3fe52fd108fd38235e4813df62442ed0f1d8ff",
"status": "affected",
"version": "857b46027d6f91150797295752581b7155b9d0e1",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3679da4ad8be84cddaf40bc307fef1fe13e051ff",
"status": "affected",
"version": "857b46027d6f91150797295752581b7155b9d0e1",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.h",
"net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c",
"net/netfilter/nft_ct.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.3"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.3",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nft_ct: move custom expectation support to helper\n\nOriginally, the ct expectation support called nf_ct_helper_ext_add() for\nconfirmed conntracks, which is invalid, triggering a splat. This was\nfixed by commit 1710eb913bdc (\"netfilter: nft_ct: skip expectations for\nconfirmed conntrack\") which restricted it to unconfirmed conntracks.\n\nHowever, early insertion of expectations into the expectations list when\nthe conntrack is unconfirmed leads to stale entries pointing to the\nwrong hlist_head through .pprev due to ct extension reallocation.\n\nCommit 7c9664351980 (\"netfilter: move nat hlist_head to nf_conn\") moved\nthe nat hlist_head to nf_conn for this reason:\n\n 1. ...\n 2. When reallocation of extension area occurs we need to fixup the\n bysource hash head via hlist_replace_rcu.\n\nI\u0027d rather not increase the size of the struct nf_conn for this feature\nhas very limited scope: only one expectation can be created at a time\ngiven expect_clash() will make nf_ct_expect_related() reports EBUSY.\nFor this reason, relax nf_ct_expect_related() not to drop packets in\ncase expectation creation fails, therefore, expectation creation becomes\nbest effort.\n\nTo address this issue, add an internal ct helper and attach it to the\nconntrack entry to streamline the custom ct expectation support with\nexisting ct helpers.\n\nExpose a new nf_conntrack_helper_release() function to release the\ninternal helper that is allocated and attached to the conntrack entry to\ncreate the custom expectations. The nft_ct module removal always waits\nfor rcu grace period, then the NULL helper callback is observed after\nthis.\n\nThis patch also restricts the creation of expectations to different\nhelpers other than this custom helper that is created for this type of\nexpectations."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90237",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:19:14.157",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:19.640",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3679da4ad8be84cddaf40bc307fef1fe13e051ff"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af3fe52fd108fd38235e4813df62442ed0f1d8ff"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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