FKIE_CVE-2026-90236
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-09-17 17:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Release the export reference when reaping open stateids
nfs4_put_stid() releases the svc_export tracked in
nfs4_stid.sc_export, but free_ol_stateid_reaplist() frees open and
lock stateids by calling ->sc_free() directly, bypassing that path.
An open stateid takes an sc_export reference in nfs4_open() and a
lock stateid takes its own in init_lock_stateid(); both reach
free_ol_stateid_reaplist() through their normal teardown, the open
stateid via release_open_stateid() and the lock stateid via
nfsd4_release_lockowner(), each through put_ol_stateid_locked().
The reference is therefore never dropped, pinning the export and
blocking unmount for the lifetime of the stateid.
Release sc_export in free_ol_stateid_reaplist() the way
nfs4_put_stid() does. ->sc_free() runs once per stateid, and a
stateid reaches free_ol_stateid_reaplist() or nfs4_put_stid() but
never both, so the reference is dropped exactly once. Revoked
stateids reach this path with sc_export already cleared by
drop_stid_export(), so they are skipped rather than double-freed.
nfs4_put_stid() itself read sc_export before acquiring cl_lock.
drop_stid_export() clears that field and releases the reference
under cl_lock, so a concurrent revocation could drop the export in
the window between the read and the final put, releasing the same
reference twice. Read sc_export while cl_lock is held so the two
paths serialize and the reference is released exactly once.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "7458727fd7cb79d09e5120b6fecc1ad11cdb0946",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ba0cde5dc81d214684b8ea0bd87414ba2f48fe02",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6480bd703684ed3f760e9e36c4a699033c0806ae",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ba0cde5dc81d214684b8ea0bd87414ba2f48fe02",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFSD: Release the export reference when reaping open stateids\n\nnfs4_put_stid() releases the svc_export tracked in\nnfs4_stid.sc_export, but free_ol_stateid_reaplist() frees open and\nlock stateids by calling -\u003esc_free() directly, bypassing that path.\nAn open stateid takes an sc_export reference in nfs4_open() and a\nlock stateid takes its own in init_lock_stateid(); both reach\nfree_ol_stateid_reaplist() through their normal teardown, the open\nstateid via release_open_stateid() and the lock stateid via\nnfsd4_release_lockowner(), each through put_ol_stateid_locked().\nThe reference is therefore never dropped, pinning the export and\nblocking unmount for the lifetime of the stateid.\n\nRelease sc_export in free_ol_stateid_reaplist() the way\nnfs4_put_stid() does. -\u003esc_free() runs once per stateid, and a\nstateid reaches free_ol_stateid_reaplist() or nfs4_put_stid() but\nnever both, so the reference is dropped exactly once. Revoked\nstateids reach this path with sc_export already cleared by\ndrop_stid_export(), so they are skipped rather than double-freed.\n\nnfs4_put_stid() itself read sc_export before acquiring cl_lock.\ndrop_stid_export() clears that field and releases the reference\nunder cl_lock, so a concurrent revocation could drop the export in\nthe window between the read and the final put, releasing the same\nreference twice. Read sc_export while cl_lock is held so the two\npaths serialize and the reference is released exactly once."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90236",
"lastModified": "2026-09-17T17:17:19.533",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:19.533",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6480bd703684ed3f760e9e36c4a699033c0806ae"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7458727fd7cb79d09e5120b6fecc1ad11cdb0946"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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